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I. INTRODUCTION
Privatization has become an important issue in the transit industry during the past decade
and became a public policy issue in general as early as 1971.1 The contracting of goods and
services and various other public/private partnerships is becoming a common occurrence
throughout the United States and even more so in other developed countries throughout the
world.
The issue of privatization in the mass transit industry is one that bas evolved considerably
over time, particularly since 1985 when the Office of Private Sector Initiatives was
established at the Urban Mass Transit Administration (UMTA), now known as the Federal
Transit Administration (FI'A). The purpose of this office is to encourage privatization
efforts in the transit industry.
The intent of this privatization study is to discuss the status and potential of privatization
of mass transit in Florida. The study will result in three technical memoranda and an
executive summary. This Technical Memorandum ( # 1) is desigJied to provide an overview
of privatization in the transit industry and includes the following sections:
• Privatization Defined - This section begins with a brief overview of the definition of
privatization in general. This is followed by a discussion of the growth and p\lrpose
of government in the provision of goods and services. Classification of goods and
services. is discussed in the context of which entity, private or public, is best for the
production and distribution of goods and services. The various categories of
privatization are provided at the conclusion of this section.
• Government Role in Transit Privatization - This section retraces the evolution of
public transportation in the United States. The role of UMTA in this evolutionary
process is reviewed, along with the evolving privatization philosophy. State level
privatization initiatives in Florida are also reviewed.
• The Transit Privatization Debate - After presenting the textbook case in support of
the concept of privatization, this section highlights and discusses the arguments in
favor of and against privatization activities in the transit industry.

1E.S.

p.

Savas, friygh"-zglipn, ·ne

~to

Better Govencmrmt (Chatham. N/: Chatham House Publishers, 1987),

122
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• Inventory of Transit Privatization Activities- This section describes a typical transit
system's organization and structure. The activities and responsibilities are identified
for each function within a transit system, including operations, maintenance, and
administration. After the inventory of activities is compiled, potential private sector
providers for each of these activities are suggested.
• The Contracting Decision - .Various approaches to the contracting of operations,
maintenance, and administration are reviewed in this section. Each approach
identifies the specific roles of the public and private sectors, ranging from full public
sector responsibility to full private sector responsibility.
• Summary- The final section summarizes the contents of this technical memorandum
and provides some insight as to the work that is to be conducted in subsequent tasks.
Specific transit privatization efforts at the national level and in Florida will be identified and
reviewed in Technical Memorandum #2. This review will provide an understanding of
national trends and activities by which to compare privatization experiences in Florida.
Technical Memorandum #3 will evaluate transit privatization efforts in Florida and compare
these efforts to those made throughout the country. Relative successes and failures will be
identified; unique national efforts will be emphasized, based on the potential they might
· have iii Florida. Areas Will be iqentified and· ranked according to their chances for success
based on observations of efforts made throughout the countcy. The approach to and
characteristics of a successful privatization contract will also be identified. State and local
initiatives concerning transit privatization efforts will be recommended where deemed
appropriate.
An Executive Summary will be prepared which will summarize the results of the three
Technical Memoranda.
·
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H. PRIVATIZATION DEFINED
pri-va-tize (pri've riz') vt. ·liztd~ ·tiz'ing fo make or hold
private; specif, to tum over (a public property, sen>ice, etc.) to
private interests - pri'va·ti·za'tion n.
Webster's New World Dimonary

OVERVIEW

According to Webster's New World Dictionary, to privatize is to turn over a public property,
service, or function to the private sector. Privatization in the mass transit industry may
include a contract with a private sector company to operate transit service, to provide
maintenance of vehicles, or to manage and administer a mass transit program. In addition,
it may involve the encouragement of the private sector to directly-operate and compete in
the provision of transit services or to create ot!Jer types of public/private partnerships. The
definition of privatization varies considerably across the country and is expanding to include
the acquisition and operation of public facilities by the private sector and even the sale of
public assets to the private sector.
This section begins with a discussion of the growth and purpose of government in tlie·
provision of goods and s.ervices and is followed by a classification of goods and services
based on the charactetistics of consumption. The specific characteristics of mass transit are
highlighted and discussed. Finally, this section identifies tbe major categories of
privatization that 'vill be considered in this technical memorandum.

GROWI'H AND PURPOSE OF GOVERNMENT

Figure 1 represents total federal, state, and local government expenditures for selected years
from 1929 through 1987.2 Total expenditures increased from just over $10 billion in 1929
to nearly $1.6 trillion in 1987, an increase of 152 percent. Likewise, total government
expenditures as a percent of gross national product (GNP) have significantly increased over
the same time period. Figure 2 indicates that government expenditures amounted to 10

'Dennis C. Mueller, Public Cl•oicc U (CAmbridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 321.
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percent of GNP in 1929 and 35 percent in !987.3 This information indicates that the role
· of government has grown dramatically in this century.
FIGURE 1
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The purpose of government has been debated through the years. Most agree that it is
necessary for government involvement in the market for some good and services; however,
differences in opinion arise concerning the degree of involvement that government should
have in the provision of goods and services. The traditional purpose of government is to
intervene when the private market fails to achieve an optimal or near-optimal allocation of
resources. That is, it is the responsibility of the government to provide public goods in order
to eliminate deficiencies of the free market. The traditional argument logically leads to a
discussion of the nature of goods and services and how they are classified. In particular,
bOW is mass transit classified? Is it a public good, or is the government intervening in a
market that would otherwise be supplied by the private sector?

CLASSIFICATION OF GOODS AND SERVICES

The classification of goods and services4 can be determined by a consideration of two
criteria: the feasibility of exclusion and the jointness of consumption.
"'Feasibility of exclusion" refers to the ability to prevent consumption of a good, generally
through pricing. A good is characterized by exclusion when buyers can be ··excluded" from
consumption unless they meet conditions established by the seller of the good, i.e., can pay
the price. Feasibility of exclusion can be easily understood by considering two e)(treme
examples. Goods purchased in the grocery store are characterized by complete exclusion
since consumers must meet the demands of the grocer by paying the price for each good.
Alternatively, national defense is characterized by no.exclusion since the protection offereCI
is consumed by all households. · There is no easy way to exclude anyone from the
consumption of national defense. A majority of goods, including mass transit, fall
somewhere between these two extremes.
"Jointness of consumption" refers to whether a good can be consumed by a single individual
or several individuals at the same time. A good can be characterized as "jointly consumed"
when many individuals can consume a good simultaneously without lowering the quantity
or quality of the good. Again, the concept is best understood by considering two extremes.
Goods purchased from the grocery store are characterized by individual consumption, while
national defense is clearly characterized by joint consumption since all households consume
national defense simultaneously.
'Hereafter, the use of the word ·~~~s· will refer co both goods and services.
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The degree of exclusion and the jointness of consumption permit the classification of goods
into four categories: private goods, conunon-pool goods, toll goods, and public goods.
These categories are the theoretical extreme combinations of the two criteria. Very few
goods (if any) can be classified as one of these pure forrns; a majority of goods fall between
the combinations at. different degrees of exclusion and of joint consumption. Each pure
form is defined below and is followed by a selected good, service, or facility which
a11proximates the pure form. To enhance the understanding of this concept. a diagram is
provided in Figure 3.5
(1)

Private Goods - refers to goods produced by the private sector where
exclusion is completely feasible and consumption is completely individual, i.e.,
private automobile.

(2)

Common-Pool Goods - refers to goods produced where exclusion is
completely infeasible, yet consumption remains completely individual, i.e., the
air we breathe.

(3)

Toll Goods - refers to goods produced where exclusion is completely feasible
and consumption is completely joint, i.e., mass transit

(4)

Public Goods • refers to goods · produced where exclusion is COI!lpletely
infeasible and consumption is completely joint, i.e., city street.

Mass transit fits the criterion for a public good in that it can be consumed jointly, but it also
fits the criterion for a private good in that it can be excluded from certain potential
consumers. As a result, mass transit is classified somewhere between a purely public and
a purely private good. As the figure indicates, mass transit is therefore classified as a toll
goop. Transit can be consumed jointly; however, since users must pay for the service,
inherent exclusion exists for those who cannot afford to pay for the use of the service.
In the early 1900s, mass transit was profitably provided by the private sector. However, with
the advent of the automobile, most mass transit systems were unable to compete as viable
transportation alternatives. The deterioration of private mass transit eventually brought
about involvement by the public sector to ensure that a means of transportation was
available for all citizens.
'Savas, Priyqrjzarion; The Key ro Bt«tr Qovemmrnr, pp. 36-38.
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The status of transit in today's society is that it is being treated more as a public good than
as a toll good. Decisions concerning where and to what extent mass transit is to be provided
are made politically. As Figure 4 indicates, mass transit has moved from the toll good realm
toward the public good realm. Various forms of privatization can be used to reverse this
process. The decision that must be made is where along this line should mass transit be
provided so as to serve the best interest of the public.
FIGURE 4
Mass 1\·a•ult, Fl'<lm Toll Good to Public Good
Private Good .._.. ""

~

--" -

Toll Good

MastTfMtlt

Coovnon-Pool Good

PublleGood
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Although certain localized markets do exist where for-profit mass transit is possible, the
· transit industry as a whole would agree that widespread provision of for-profit mass transit
is infeasible. However, many contend that strategic use of the private sector through
competitive contracting and various public/private partnership arrangements can result in
more effective and .efficient provision of transit services. Several categories of transit
privatization will be reviewed in this memorandum.

CATEGORIES OF PRIVATIZATION

Privatization activities can be placed into two major categories: the contracting of services
and public/private partnerships.6 The contracting of services is the most common form of
privatization. A government entity contracts with a private sector company or organization
to provide a specific service such as the provision of transit services, garbage collection,
building or grounds maintenance, etc. Other public/private partnerships include such
arrangements as joint development, cross-border leasing, transportation demand
management initiatives, and turnkey operations. All of these privatization opportunities 'vill
be discussed in this technical memorandum.

..

"Touche Ross, f!jvgtjWi011 in Americg (Washington, DC; Touche Ross, 1987), p. J.
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JII. GOVERNMENT ROLE IN TRANSIT PRIVATIZATION
This section reviews the evolution of mass transit and transit privatization in the United
States. A brief summary of the mass transit industry prior to 1985 is provided, along with
a discussion of numerous factors that contributed to many changes in the transit industry.
The creation of the Urban Mass Transportati?n Administration (UMTA) and its role in the
transit industry is discussed. A review of the federal initiative in privatization during the
early 1980s is provided and is followed by a discussion of UMTA's initial philosophy
regarding privatization. Privatization programs created by UMTA to provide more
opportunities for the private sector are also reviewed. This section then reviews how
UMTA's original privatization philosophy evolved so that the implementation of the
program has remained feasible and attractive to the industry. . The section concludes with
a review of government involvement in privatization within the state of Florida.

EVOLUTION OF MASS TRANSIT THROUGH 1985

Most transit systems operating in the United States started as private companies that
provided service in metropolitan areas. The transit-dependent markets that existed in these
areas from the late.l930s to the late 1950s helped most of these systems to ope~ate with.
little or no public subsidie~ and to even realize a·profit. Competition from the automobile
contributed to declining transi.t ridership, and many companies went out of business or
struggled to survive. By the early 1970s, nearly all private transit systems either had been
acquired by public authorities or ceased to exist. This resulted from a number of factors
including suburbanization, rising incomes, declining automobile costs, and numerous others.
During World War II, the U.S. economy was in an upswing, but motor fuel was rationed,
making single-occupant automobile travel impractical and uneconomical. As indicated in
Figure 5, rapid growth in transit ridership was experienced in this country during the war.
However, this trend did not continue in the post-war era. Ridership began to decline from
the levels experienced during the war. Cheaper fuel and a government policy that
encouraged low-density housing contributed to the suburbanization that occurred during the
1960s. Along with the development of the automobile, suburbanization caused a loss of
urban population densities, resulting in a negative effect on the profitability of transit
systems.

9

FIGURES
Major Trends in TnllSit Ridership
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Table 1 provides data concemfng the extent of suburbanization from 1950 to 1980. These
data show the percent of the population residing in the central city and suburba!l ring. It.
also summarizes d(lta on travel modes from 1950 to 1990. As discussed above, these 'd ata
depict a significant shift in the country's population from residing in urban areas to residing
in suburban areas.. The data also indicate a shift from mass transit use to private
automobile use.

In an effort to survive and maintain profitability, transit systems raised fares and cut
unprofitable serviceS: At the same time, these systems were unable to invest in capital
equipment. Each of these measures was viewed by the bus industry as necessary for
survival, but, in fact, they contributed to further declines in transit patronage and reductions
in the number of bus systems that remained in operation.

.

.

As other American cities grew into metropolitan areas, the need for integrated transit
services increased. However, many conventional transit markets, in which most travel
focused on destinations within the central business district, evolved into cities with several
destination centers. The dispersion of destination centers made it extremely difficult for
private transit systems to operate effectively. As a result, many private transit companies
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deteriorated rapidly. Along with the declines in ridership, this created concerns about the
financial stability of the industry in the early 1960s.
TABLE 1

Suburbanlzallon or Populallon and Shllt In Travel Modes, 1950 to 1980

. .. ,, . . .
iJfff::.sul>urbantziiilo!J.
.,.
... ;,. . . ~n>opulatioli
.
. : .· ..
*'B· t': 1i;\$rlk·.,·; Travel·Modes. . ·
·~·

·::-

Year

,, ~ >to-· · ··

' "~ ·: · ·"'

• wK.·

Central Cll)'

Suburban Ring

~

~" " " ' , .

· ·'-' "' .

•

,.

•

.

· · ·
.(... . ... • " .

Total Passtnger
Trips (millions)

Passenger Cars
(biUions or

.'
''

.

vehicle miles)

1950

57.3%

42.7%

17,246

n/a

1960

49.2%

50.8%

9,395

nfa

1970

43.1%

56.9%

7,332

916.7

1980

39.89%

60.11%

8,228

1,111.6

1990

n/a

nja

8,873

1,485.5

Sources: Edwin S. Mills and Bruce W. Hamilton, Urban Economics, pp. 64, 229; APTA, 1991 Transit fact
!!QQk; United States Department of Transportation, Highway Statistics !989, 1990; Oak Ridge
National Laboratory. Transportation Encrg:,: Data &ok; Edition 11, 1991.

In response to these .concerns, Congress established the Urban Mass Transportation
Adrriinistration (UMTA). The purpose of this agency was to revitalize the transit industry
through grant programs aimed at providing funding for capital and operating costs of transit
services. UMTA helped many city and regional authorities acquire private transit companies
and also provided the federal funding necessary to help resurrect the declining industry.
By supporting transit, UMTA brought new challenges to the industry. Federal subsidies did
not resolve the problems. Indeed, this public policy helped eliminate the economic
incentives for operating mass transit systems and has often been blamed for contributing to
higher transit costs and reduced revenues.
As indicated in Table 2, total revenue of transit systems increased 363 percent, from 3.5

billion in 1975 to nearly 16 billion in 1990, while total ridership increased 21 percent from
1970 to 1990 (from 7.3 billion to 8.8 billion passenger trips)-1 At the same time, total

'James A. Dunn Jr. and William Felix, Privatizing Local Services As a federal Policy Gog!; The Cast of New
ltmy Trt111sll (At/tlll/4.' Annual Meeling of /he Somhem Political Science Associlllion, 1990), p. 2.

l1

operating expense increase 389 percent while total operating revenues increased 138
percent, which resulted in a significant decline in the operating ratio (operating revenue
divided by operating expense), from 54 percent in 1975 to 37 percent in 1990.
TABLEZ
Mass Traosil Tronds (ill mlilions)

..

3,752.5

1975

54%

1?80

42%

1985

37%

Source: APTA, 1991 Tran<jt Fact Book.

As a result of UMTA programs, local governments began to acquire, plan, construct, and

operate new and/or refur)>ished mass transit systems. However, despite the increase in
government involvement, declines in productivity and the return on transit investments
remained prevalent in the industry. ln addition, increases in ridership were marginal (21
percent increase for the period from 1970 to 1990) when compared to the change in funding
to this industry. Although it permitted continued operation of transit systems, public support
did not result in improved productivity or increased ridership.
By the early 1980s, UMTA began to reconsider its role as the financier of transit agencies.
The UMTA program, which grew to over $4 billion in the early 1980s, declined to $3 billion
by 1985.8 Local government officials discovered that budget problems were not only a
concern at the federal level but at all levels of government. Also, during much of the 1980s.
the country continued to experience significant demographic changes. As suburbs began to
mature, they also started serving as trip destinations for a significant portion of commuters.
Reverse commuting (a commute trip that has an urban area as its origin and a suburban
area as its destination) was beginning to comprise a much greater portion of peak hour trips.
'Ibid., p. 4.
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This signaled a dramatic change in travel patterns for most systems. Instead of suburb·tO·
central city trips, many trips became central city-to-suburb or suburb-to-suburb trips, making
it difficult for transit to provide cost-effective service.
Changes in transit operating practices, markets, and funding created a challenge for all
· parties involved in the transit industry. Transit systems needed to maintain quality service
for the public but they also needed adequate funding. Transit patrons needed seivice, but
at an affordable price.

FEDERAL INITIATIVE IN TRANSIT PRIVATIZATION

By the beginning of the first Reagan administration in 1981, it was generally believed that
federal transit assistance should not continue to grow. The administration subsequently
adopted the following policy:
Stop spending federal money on new rail transit systems; stop giving federal
operating subsidies to a transit industry whose deficits are rising every year;
return competition and private enterprise to a central role in the urban transit
industry.9
Administration officials ·Who criticized the increased amount .of federal funding to transit
systems developed what bas been phrased ·as the "privatization paradigm." This practice
sought to encourage such activities as "load shedding." Load shedding refers to the
contracting of the more expensive transit services, such as high-cost special services for the
elderly and handicapped, low volume routes, weekend services, and rush hour service on
highly patronized routes.
In September 1983, UMTA worked to develop a policy that would prompt more private
enterprise participation in mass transit programs. Most transit officials believed this new
concept in transit services was based on the Reagan administration's overall strategy to
return some public services to the private sector where they could potentially be provided
in a more efficient manner. It was considered unfair to exclude private operators from the
mass transit markets. The revised program was a significant attempt to include private
carriers in local transit planning and operations.

'Ibid., p. 6.
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Historically, transit systems have contracted with the private sector for a variety of goods
·and services but never as a matter of policy, although such a policy was in the original
Urban Mass Transportation Act:
"...the Secretary finds that such program, to the maximum extent feasible,
provides for the participation of private mass transportation companies...."10
[emphasis added]
In October 1984, UMTA's Policy on Private Enterprise Involvement was announced. This
policy was viewed as evidence that a new philosophy was being established in the
administration of federal transit programs. The policy would no longer allow mass transit
systems to monopolize transit markets, especially in charter services. The goal was to
initiate a practice that would enable private transit systems to become partners in meeting
local transit needs.

Legislative Background of Private Enterprise in Mass Transit
The first reference to private carrier inclusion occurs in Section Two of the 1964 Urban
Mass Transportation Act. It states the following:
· The purpose of the Act is to encourage the planning and establishment of
. area wide urban mass transportation systems, needed for economical and
desirable urban development, with the cooperation of public and private mass
transportation companies; and to provide assistance to public bodies in
financing such systems, to be operated by public or private mass
transportation companies, as determined by local needs.n
This provides a good reference for the development of privatization policies in the mass
transit industry and leads to three other provisions in the Act that relate directly to the
Private Enterprise Involvement Program. Sections 3(e), 8(e), and 9(£) provide the legal
foundation for the program.

10

Section 3(e)(2), UMTA Ac4 1964.

11Edward

Weiner, Urban Trga.sooaeJion Plonninr in the United States, An Historical Qyetyiew (New l'ot~:

Praeger Publisher$, 1987), p. 92.
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Section 3(e) protects existing private mass transportation companies from federally-assisted
acquisition or competitive service. The Secretary of the U.S. Department of Transportation
(USDOT) is the final authority on whether protection for private operators is warranted.
More specifically, the Secretary may find that financial assistance to a public body or agency
is essential for maintaining a transit program within a given local area. The Secretary may
find that such assistance will, "to the maximum extent feasible," include any private carriers
in the transit planning process. In addition, if a private carrier, franchise, or property is
acquired via financial assistance to a public agency, just compensation will be paid as
required by state and local laws. Another provision allows the Secretary of Labor to verify
that any assistance will not have an adverse e{fect on employment conditions in the transit
industry.
Section 8(e) requires that federally-assisted plans and programs encourage the active
participation of private enterprise to the "maximum extent feasible." It also requires the
UMTA Administrator to determine whether the planning process complies with Section 8.
Section 9(f) requires that the local program of projects be planned and determined with
input from interested parries and that the program be published to afford all affected
2
citizens--private transportation providers and others--the opportunity to comment.'

UMTA lNlTIAL' PHILOSOPHY
Soon after announcing its new policy on private enterprise participation, UMTA officials
discovered tl:lat promulgating this concept would be a significant challenge. The challenge
was to maintain local decisiorunak:ing authority for transit operations while at the same time
creating an environment conducive to private involvement in the development of transit
'services. The issue was further complicated by the fact that mOSt decisions concerning
transit services were made by local transit authorities, many of which viewed this new policy
as detrimental to their future existence.
The policy's aim was to promote competition in the transit industry by requiring federal
grantees to develop local processes for considering private sector involvement in the delivery
of transit services. This policy also required the documentation of private participation as
part of grantees' Section 3 and 9 programs. Local authorities were given the flexibility to
"FtdUGI Highway Administnztion, Private Stctor Briel! (April 1987), p. 2·2
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determine how to include private participation in the delivery of transit services for their
market needs, but were required to comply with the UMTA Private Enterprise Policy. The
policy designates the local Metropolitan Planning Organization (MPO) as the responsible
agent for ensuring that the process is followed.
One of the UMTA programs immediately affected by the new policy was the Public/ Private
Partnership Program. As pan of the original Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964, a
Public/Private Partnership Program was established to encourage local public/private
partnerships in the development of urban and suburban transportation facilities and services.
UMTA's role was to provide seed funding for the implementation of local capital and
service development projects that had been primarily funded by local governments and
private sector entities. The program was not intended to provide continued federal funds
for capital, operating, and maintenance expenditures. UMTA's privatization program
resulted in increased opportunities for public/private partnerships and increased the chances
of building successful relationships between the public and private sectors. tl
Policy

Obj~tives

UMTA's policy on Private.Enterprise Participation is based on three objectives:
• Compliance With Legislative Mandates.
• Containment of Costs.
• Improved Response to Changing Market Demands.
Compliance with Legislative Mandates- As indicated previously, Sections 3(e) and 8(e) of
the Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964 conditioned federal financial assistance on
findings that local transportation plans and programs, "to the maximum extent feasible,"
provide for the participation of private mass transportation companies and encourage the
participation of private enterprise.14 The Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1982
added strength to this policy by amending section 9(f) of the Act to require grantees to
include private carriers in the transit planning process.

"UrbiJII Mess TtiJIISpoltalion AdministroJion, Public/Private Pqdlrtrsltjps (Washington, DC: Urban M<Us
Transportation Administrotion).
"Ibid., p. N-6.
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Containment or Costs • In light of the increasing cost of operating mass transit systems,
privatization has been viewed as the most promising mechanism to improve transit's cost
performance.
1mproved Response .to Changing Market Demands • As discussed earlier, a significant
demographic change took place during the 1980s. Traditional commute trips, which began
in suburbs and ended in urban centers, were being overwhelmed by urban-to-suburban trips
and suburban-to-suburban trips. The intention of this objective is to use privatization to
help meet the changing market demand of transit markets. The policy states that
privatization enables transit providers to be more flexible in responding to new types of trip
making. At the same time, it allows mass transit systems to focus on traditional route
services.
Private Enterprise Participation Program Elements
The Private Enterprise Participation Program "stipulates that the private sector be assured
of participation in transit plannittg and operations through the establishment of a local
process that sets forth mechanisms for participation." Each grantee must develop and adopt
a local process that will include private participation il\ the delivery of transportation
services "to the maximum extent feasible" in order to be in compliance with the UMTA
legislative mandate. The local process must include the following elements:
Notification and Early Consultation • The process must provide for notice to and early
consultation with private operators concerning plans for new or restructured service, as well
as periodic re-examination of existing service.
Consideration of Private Service Provision· This elernent refers to periodic examination of
each route to determine if it could be more efficiently provided by a private sector entity.
''Periodic examination" refers to at least once every three years.
Compliance. The compliance elem.ent requires a description of how new and restructured
services have been evaluated to determine if they could be more efficiently provided l'ly
private sector entities pursuant to a competitive bidding process.
Cost Comparisons ·The use of costs as a factor in the public/private decision is the mo't
controversial and misunderstood element o! the policy statement. When comparing serv;(e.
proposals from public and private operators, UMTA grantees must prepare a fully-allocated
17

cost comparison. Fully-allocated costs refer to the cost of providing a service including the
appropriate share of overhead and other shared expenses. J.S The use of fully-allocated cost
analysis ensures that local decisionmakers have considered all costs associated with in-house
proviSion of transit services.
Complaints. The process provides for a dispute resolution process that affords all interested
parties an opporTUnity to object to initial decisions concerning the delivery of transit services.
UMTA's complaint process is designed to accept appeals of the local dispute resolution
process.
Capital Cost of Contracting -This UMTA policy permits grantees the option to use capital
assistance rather than operating assistance to pay for the cost of privately-owned capital
resources in the provision of transit serv!ces awarded to the private sector entity through the
competitive bidding process.
As mentioned earlier, .it is the responsibility of the MPO to verify that grantees are in

compliance with the program elements identified above. MPOs rely on two documents, the
Annual Element (AE) and the Transportation Improvement Program (TIP), to make their
decisions. The AE lists the programs and projects scheduled for the following year within
a region. The TIP specifies the region's priorities over the next five years, the first year
being consistent with the AE. Prior to submitting the AE, the MPO is required to certify ·
that grantees have· followed the appropriate local process and to describe how the local
process led to the development of the projects contained in the AE.
State Response to UMTA Philosophy
UMTA's philosophy of mandating private sector involvement in the planning and operation
of transit services was not supported by most states with the enthusiasm that UMTA had
anticipated. While some state and local agencies attempted to make policies and guidelines
to meet the policy requirements, many legislated statutes to placate UMTA and to
accommodate private sector entry into the tra.nsit industry. New Jersey Transit (NJT) is one
of only a few state agencies that adopted a program to meet the UMTA privatization
challenge. The NJT policy requires the agency to review its service every year and to
contract out approximately five percent of its transit operations to the private sector.

"PrivaliZ4liotl Council TnlllSponation Task Force, fuhlic·frivate Parowships in fn(rqs((UcQI-e, A Briif Guide
to Proit.ct Prfncjplu. 9114 Ltfislative lniligtivts (Washington, DC: Privatization Council, 1991), Appendix A.
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However, NIT does not use the UMTA-recommended fully-allocated cost analysis
methodology for cost comparisons. NJT uses an avoidable cost criteria (actual cost
reduction) wben comparing its in-house costs of service provision with that of private sector
entities.

EVOLUTION SINCE 1.985

The new private participation policy was viewed as an assistance program that could help
private systems take over a significant portion of the regional markets. Early attempts at
implementing this policy focused on involving private systems in the local transit ·planning
process, improving public/private consultation, and developing a dispute resolution process.
It is clear that UMTA officials had great difficulty in obtaining the cooperation of public
transit systems. They realized that the philosophy would have to evolve in order to achieve
acceptability in a transit industry that had proven to be extremely volatile. Since Congress
was reluctant to revise the 1964 Urban Mass Transportation Act to force increased private
participation, a new concept was needed.
To gain acceptance from the transit industry, UMTA implemented a policy that conditioned
grant funding on compliance with UMTA's privatization program. In light of this new
requirement, many agencies developed prograJllS to ensure !hat the disbursement of capital
and operating funds would ·n~t be interrupted. The repe.rcussions of this unwritten policy
created artirnosity toward the administration from local officials.
In 1986, a House Appropriations Committee investigated charges that UMTA was
"conditioning" approval of grant applications on the progress toward its administrativelymandated privatization goals.16 ln the appropriation authorization, Congress wa~ critical
of UMTA's unwritten policy. Congress also rebutted the administration's attempt at setting
quotas to be met by transit agencies and indicated that the administrative leverage of
UMTA had its limits.
Because of criticism from Congress, UMTA changed its philosophical tactics. Without
broad support for the privatization program from the transit industry, the program had poo r
prospects for success. As a result, UMTA began to rethink its position on its privatizatio n
policies and programs.
"Dunn tutd Felix, p. 10.
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Current Philosophy
Unlike the original concept of privatization, where UMTA encouraged mass transit systems
to include private systems in the provision of mass transit services, the most recent approach
is quite different. With changing transit markets, a federal budget crisis, and transit budget
deficits, UMTA discovered that, instead of competing for existing markets, more emphasis
should be placed on specialized markets, including express commute, reverse commute,
paratransit, and regional services. Effective use of the private sector could be made in
serving these specialized markets.
As stated earlier, conventional transit markets are rapidly changing and new transit markets
are emerging. As a result, the proportion of trips destined for the central city continues to
decline. An increasing number of trips are oriented from the central city to the suburbs and

from suburb-to-suburb. Moreover, metropolitan travel requirements have become too
diverse and diffused to be served with a single, uniform type of service. A significant
portion of urban travel demand has become segmented into small market niches that
require a more personalized, custom-tailored approach. Private sector involvement in transit
services to these non-traditional markets appears to be a viable alternative for meeting their
specialized requirements.
.

UMTA established the Entrepreneurial Services Challenge Grant Program (ESP) in 1987
to encourage private entrepreneurs to provide market-driven services. The program is based
on a dual belief that large, publicly-run transit systems cannot be "all things to all people"
and that consumers will support a well-operated, ·well-managed, profit-making transit
operation that addresses their ·specific needs. 17 UMTA believes that such services can be
most effectively provided by private entrepreneurs with assistance from the business
community, local government, neighborhood groups, and the local transit agency.
Rather than a system approach to meeting needs, these services tend to represent a network
of individualized and high quality services that are supported by fares and/or beneficiaries.
UMTA regards this new approach as an impetus to entrepreneurial involvement in mass
transit and as a market for the private sector to focus its efforts. It also encourages the
private community, business groups, and corporate employers to develop services to meet
their own needs rather than to depend upon the public sector to do it for them.

"Utban Mass Transporl4ticn Administrarion, Proceedj11gs from OriQudo AnnuQ/ Conference. p. JJ.].
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Congress has not contributed strong legislative support to this program. With the exception
of the actions taken in response to the 1986 charges of conditioning the approval of grants
on the progress that agencies were making to comply with the administration's mandate,
very little has been done .
.

During the 1990s, the transit industry will be faced with additional demands and
requirements that conventional transit systems will find difficult to meet. One of these
requirements comes under the new amendments to the 1990 Clean Air Act. Under this
amendment, employers are required to reduce their employees' use of single-occupant
automobiles for commuting to work when the company does not comply wit)! the
requirements of the Act. This could stimulate the need for commute alternatives, such as
vanpools, buses, shuttles from train stations and park-and-ride lots, and others.
Another federal policy that will influence transit systems throughout the U.S. is the
Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA). This Act mandates that transit services be fully
accessible to all members of society, including the disabled population. This is an expensive
requirement for most transit agencies, but it provides an opportunity for the private sector
to become even more involved in the provision of transit services to all segments of the
population.

FLORIDA
In Florida, privatization of transit operations has not proceeded to the same extent as in the
New Jersey example. Notwithstanding the efforts to contract paratransit services by some
of the state's transit systems and an attempt to sell franchise rights to the private sector for
the development of a high speed rail system, the State of Florida has remained neutral with
respect to the privatization of mass transit services. However, several Florida transit system$
have privatized certain services, and other systems have investigated the potential benefits
that can be realized by contracting some fixed-route service.
In 1988, the Metro-Dade Transit Agency (MDTA) initiated a Private Enterprise
Participation Program as an UMTA demonstration project, which resulted in a contract for
fixed-route service with Greyhound Lines. A six-month evaluation of this contract by Price
Waterhouse revealed that, although substantial cost savings were realized, the contract also
resulted in a decline in service quality, service reliability and ridership.
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In Tampa, the Hillsborough Area Regional Transit (HART) conducted a study in 1987 that
focused on the benefits of a public/private partnership in providing quality transportation
services in Hillsborough County. The study recommended a growth strategy that would use
existing HART resources and private sector resources to improve the quality of service in
this area. Due to a change in management at HART and declines in ridership and funding,
the agency bas not been able to implement the recommended strategy.
Tri-County Commuter Rail (Tri-Rail) operates a commuter rail line from Palm Beach
County through Broward County to Dade County. The administration and operation of this
system are provided completely by a private sector company under contract with FDOT.
In fiscal year 1990, 10 Florida systems provided some fiXed-route transit service through
contracts with private sector entities. Likewise, 11 Florida systems contracted with private
entities to provide demand-response services.
Although no privatization efforts have been specifically sponsored or mandated by the State
of Florida, it is clear that nothing has been done to preclude the implementation of
privatization efforts. It is evident that the State of Florida and FDOT have remained
neutral concerning the concept of privatization. However, interest in the concept is clearly
expressed by FDOT through the sponsorship of this specific privatization study.
hiterest in the privatization of toll facilities wa5 indicated recently when Florida passed
legislation to foster the' privatization philosophy within the state. The Florida Private
Transportation Facilities Act (1991), Section 334.30 of the Florida Statutes, authorizes the
Florida Department of Transportation, with legislative 'approval,
to enter into agreements allowing private entities to construct and operate
privately owned and financed transportation facilities; authorizing the private
entity to charge tolls or fares; requiring private transportation facilities to
comply with all requirements of federal, state, and local laws, and state,
regional, and local comprehensive plans, and department rules, policies,
procedures, and standards for transportation facilities, and any other
conditions which the department determines to be in the public's best interest;
authorizing the department to exercise any power possessed by it to facilitate
·
private transportation projects; providing an effective date.'8
Although this Act refers to private toll facilities, it does indicate a willingness of the State
Legislature to support private sector involvement.

"Florida Private Transportation Facilities AC4 Seclion A.
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IV. THE TRANSIT PRIVATIZATION DEBATE

The debate over the use of privatization in the t<ansit industry has been heated, particulady
since 1985 when UMTA began encouraging the concept "to the maximum extent feasible."
Significant support has emerged in the literature during the past decade; however, significant
opposition to the concept remains. Convincing arguments can be made in favor of and
against the concept of privatization. The purpose of this section is to objectively present
both sides of the issue. It is surprising to learn that, despite significant opposition, very little
literature has been published that is negative towards the concept of privatization in the
transit industry. However, a sufficient amount of literature has been reviewed to adequately
represent the supporting and opposing viewpoints.
This section will first present the textbook case that supports the concept of privatization
from a strict economic point of view. This discussion will not be limited to the transit
industry but will be a consideration of the privatization concept in general. The issues
raised in the textbook justification will indicate to the reader why the concept is so readily
supported. The theoretical model results in desirable characteristics. The textbook
discussion will then be applied to a discussion of privatization in the transit industry. The
two types of privatization indicated previously, contracting of services and other
public/private partnerships, will be discussed at length in the context of the transit industry,
and supporting and opposing
viewpoints will be presented
..
. .where applicable.
It is important to note that the intention of this technical memorandum is not to draw
conclusions as to which viewpoint is correct, but to effectively present both sides of the
debate so that all of the relevant issues are understood. Conclusions and applications to
Florida's transit systems will be provided in subsequent technical memoranda after other
tasks have been completed.

TEXTBOOK CASE FOR PRIVATIZATION
The textbook case in favor of privatization lies in ihe theoretical framework of perfect
competition. The following conditio.ns must be present in order for perfect competition to
exist in a market:
• Large number of private buyers and sellers.
• Freedom of entry and exit in the private industry.
• Homogene.ous product.
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•
•
•
•

Perfect mobility of resources.
Perfect knowledge of market.
No positive or negative extetrtalilies.
No concentration of power among the private buyers or se11ers.

When these conditions are met, the market is perfectly competitive and has the following
desirable characteristics:
• Consumer preferences are fulfilled with largest amount of goods consistent with
minimum prices, the lowest costs of production, and known productio~t techniques
of business firms.
• Society's resources are allocated in the most efficient manner.
• Flexible product and resource prices assure full employment o( all resources used
.
in the production of goods and services.
• Competition among employers for resources causes resource owners to be paid
their opportunity costs, which is determined by the market value of the respective
contributions to total output by each resource.
• With consumer incomes and preferences assumed to be . constant, aggregate
consumer satisfaction would be maximized because goods/services would be
distributed among consumers according to their demands. 19
.

.

The characteristics described above provide a strong textbook case for privatization, with
the logic being that, through privatization, these desirable characteristics can be
approximated. Everyone agrees that perfectly competitive markets do not exist in reality,
and many argue that perfect competition is purely a theoretical model and is impractical.
Economists argue that perfect competition is a theoretical extreme used to describe an
optimal market situation that is relatively simple. Supporters of privatization believe that
moving away from public to private provision of goods and services (or somewhere in
between) will at least help to achieve some of the positive qualities of perfect competition.
Furthermore, public agencies are not subjected to market forces which would force them
to provide goods and services in an efficient manner. In a perfectly competitive market, if
a firm does not conform to the market forces, it will be driven out of business.
The application and consideration of privatization in the transit industry has been discussed
thoroughly in the literature, with the majority of transit privatization referring to the

19

Miiron H. Spencer, CoartnuW•IJ! MjcrQeCQ112'nics (New York: Wayne State University. 1990), p. IH
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contracting of services to the private sector. This form of privatization permits the public
agency to be involved in the provision of the good or service while still involving the private
sector. Contracting services is discussed at length in the functional areas of operations,
maintenance, and administration. Other types of privatization are also discussed, including
joint development, a:oss border leasing, transportation demand management initiatives, and
turnkey operations.

CONTRACl'ING OF SERVICES

The contracting of services in the transit industry is the most common form of privatization
and will be discussed in three functional areas, including operations, maintenance, and
administration.
Operations
Specific types of operations include demand-response services, commuter express bus
services, and other fixed-route services such as local bus service. Demand-response service
is historically viewed as the operation most commonly contracted to the private sector. A
voluminous amount of literature exists concerning the contracting of transit service
operations.
Transit Contracting in Florida - A review of the 19 major transit systems in Florida
indicates that the extent of privatization has increased over time in the provision of both
demand-response (DR) services and fixed-route (FR) services. The number of revenue
miles provided by private systems as a percent of the total revenue miles provided in the
state of Florida increased from two percent in 1985 to over 14 percent in 1990. The
increase is particularly significant in the provision of DR services, which increased from 34
percent in 1985 to nearly 74 percent in 1990. Increases are also apparent in the number of
passenger trips and the amount of operating expense. Figures 6 through 8 provide selected
data as taken from Section 15 reports prepared by Florida's transit systems.20

"'Urban Mass Tran.rporttztitm Administratiall, Nariona! Urban Mass Transportarion Starisrics, Section /5(lnaugl
Repgrts, 1984-1989. and aelUal 1990 Section 15 reportS submitted by Florida's transit systems.
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FIGURE 6
Percent or Revenue Miles Provided by the Privlltt Sector
as a Percent or Total Revenue Miles
Florida, 1985·1990
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FIGURE 7
Percent of Passenger Trips Served by the Private Sector
as a Percent of Total Passenger Trips
Florida, 1985·1990
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Percent of Operating Expense Consumed by the Private Se<tor
as a Percent of Total Operating Expense
Florida, 1985-1990
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Transit Contracting in the United States - Figures 9 through 11 provide the percent of
transit services provided by the private sector for the nation as a who le, as measured by
revenue miles, passenger trips, and operating expense. The three modes in which
privatization has had the greatest impact are provided in the table and include fixed-route
motorbus (MB), commuter rail (CR), and demand-response (DR). The data are provided
for the years 1984 through 1989. Other modes, such as rapid rail, streetcar, trolley bus, ferr)'
boat, and otherS, are not included because little or none of the service provided through
these other modes has been contracted out 21
FIGURE9
Pemot or ~oue Miles Provided by the Private Sector
as a Ptreeot or Total Revenue Miles
United States, 1984-1989
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FIGURE 10
Percent or Passenger Trips Se.ved by the Private Sector
as a Perceot ot Total Passenger Trips
United States, 1984-1989
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FIGURE 11
Pera:nt or Operating Expense Coosumed by the Pdvnte S(ctor

as a Percent of Total Opernting Expense
United States, 1984·1989
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The amount of fixed-route motorbus service contracted to the private sector as a percent
of total fixed-route motorbus service has increased only slightly from 1984 to 1989. The
same data calculated for commuter rail indicates that the amount of service contracted as
a percent of total service has declined over the same time period. The demand-response
service is clearly the dominant privatized service at the national level, just as in Florida.
However, unlike Florida, the percent of demand-response provided by the private sector as
a percent of total demand-response service was relatively stable from 1984 to 1989. For
example, 68 percent of all demand-response revenue miles was provided by the private
sector in 1984, which declined slightly to 64 percent in 1989. The trend is also relatively
stable for demand-response passenger trips, declining from 66 percent to 65 percent.
However, it is clear that the operating expense for privately-operated demand-response
services as a percent of total has increased consistently over time from 49 percent in 1984
to 55 percent in 1989.
The effect of UMTA's private enterprise policy enacted in 1985 does not appear to have
significantly impacted the portion of services provided by the private sector at the national
level. Significant privatization was already prevalent in demand-response services prior to
the enactment of this policy. The slight increases in the contracting of fiXed-route motorbus
services may be attributed, in part, to UMTA's policy.
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Despite the pressure and encouragement expressed by UMTA in the mid to late 1980s, it
is clear that, with the exception of demand-response service, widespread contracting of
transit services has not occurred in the United States or in Florida. Even in the case of
demand-response service, significant contracting occurred prior to the private enterprise
policy established at UMTA. If the textbook case for privatization is true, it is not clear why
the use of privatization bas not been more widespread in the provision of all types of
services. The remainder of this section will review various arguments in favor of and against
the privatization of transit operations.
The Contracting of Operations • The debate over the contracting of transit operations
continues to be a widely-discussed topic throughout the United States. This section
discusses the major issues related to the concept and presents the various arguments in favor
of and against the use of privatization in the context of the identified issues. Table 3
summarizes the issues and arguments associated with the contracting of transit operations.
A detailed discussion of the issues is provided as well.
TABLE3
Summary of Issues in the Contracting of Transit OperaUons

Reduced Bureaucracy
Reduced Time Costs
Slower Cost Growth
Potential for Economies of Seale
Potential for Labor Specialization
Exj>ancled Tax Base for Transit

Public Provision Less Costly
Neglected Costs of Private Provision
Cost Allocation Deficiencies
Exploitation of Transit Employees
Contract Waste

Optimal Allocation of Resources
Minimum Cost
Incentive for Efficient Production

Monopoly Power in Long Run
Potential for Corruption
Reduced Cost is Wrong Priority
Contract Shortcomings
Insufficient Number of ~~~~

~~

Deterioration in Service Quality

Deterioration in

Strong Union
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!&ll - Many efforts have been made to compare the costs of public and private provision
of transit services. A majority of these efforts suggest that significant cost sav:ings can result
from the contracting of operations.22 Others believe that cost savings cannot always be
achieved and that, in most cases, the methodologies used for cost comparisons inherently
favor the private sector option.%3 As a result, arguments can be made to support and
refute the idea that' cost savings exist as a result ·of the contracting of operations.
In situations where private operators have been substituted for previously publicly-operated
transit service, actual cost sav:ings can be measured. A sample of seven such substitutions
in the U .S. were reviewed, with resulting cost savings ranging from 22 to 39 percent.24 If
cost sav:ings do exist, it is interesting to note that very few research efforts have been
conducted to determine the sources of these sav:ings. Many contest that, if cost savings do
result from the contracting of operations, it is at the direct expense of transit labor in the
form of reduced wages and fringe benefits. Teal and Black attribute a significant portion
of the savings to wage and fringe differentials between public and private systems. However,
Teal also attributes significant sav:ings to increased employee productivity and reduced
overhead in the private sector.25 In addition, Black also indicates that specific work rules
contribute to reduced employee productivity in the public sector.26 Regardless of the
source of cost savings, the threat or reality of contracting can significantly impact public
agencies. The prospect of hav:ing private operators replace serv:ice prev:iously prov:ided by .
the public agency can greatly influence wage negotiations, work rules, and productivity. ·

.

.

.

.

'

Arguments for and against cost savings as a result of contracting are presented on the
following page.

'-'RtJger F. Tea~ "issues Raised By Competitive CoiiiNZcting of Bus Tronsit Services in tJoe USA." Trgn.rnonorion
P/annlnc and Techno/OJ1'l (United Iangdom: Gordon and Breach Science Publishers SA, 1991), pp. 393-396-

"Elliott D. Sclar, K. H. Schaeffer, <utd Roben BN111dwein, The Emperor's New C!Q/hes: Trgnsir Privarizatjon
and P!tblic Policy (Washington. DC: Economic Policy Jnsritute, 1989), p. I.
11Teal,

"Issues R<>ised By Competitive Contracting of Bus Transit Services in rlre USA," p. 393.

"Ibid, p. 403.
'"Al4n Black, fdygrlrgrion of Urban Transit: A Differeac Perwecrive (Lawrence. KS: Tronsportation Research

Boord, 1991), p. 18.
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Cost-Related Alguments For Contracting:
• Reduced Bureaucracy - Thomas Borcherding has suggested what is known as the
"Bureaucratic Rule of Two,'' 27 which refers to the belief that "removal of an activity
from the private to the public sector will double its unit cost of production." The term
refers to the idea that bureaucracy leads to greater costs. It has been suggested that the
private sector can provide services at much lower costs because of reduced labor costs,
lower overhead, and freedom from regulatory burden. In addition, the administration
and monitoring of private contracts tend to be a small percentage of the cost of providing
service, and transition costs from public provision to private provision do not eliminate
the savings resulting from competitive contracting.28
·

• Reduced Time Costs - When a public agency desires to significantly expand transit
services, it often requires an extended period of time to acquire the equipment and
facilities necessary for expansion. The contracting of services to the private sector
eliminates the need for acquisitions; equipment and facilities already owned by the
private sector can be used for expansion or, if additional equipment and facilities are
required, the private sector can procure them more rapidly.

• .Slower Cost Growth - Costs resulting from competitively contracted services tend to rise
at a much slower r~te than those from publicly-provided services. For exa!llple, a
suburban Chicago public bus system competitively contracts for service on many of its
routes. From 1986 to 1987, costs increased 3.2 percent on publicly-operated routes;
however, the cost of service provided on the contracted routes declined in new contracts
9
and resulted in savings that ranged between 2.6 and 32.9 percent?

• Potential for Economies of Scale - Mass transit systems may benefit from large private
transit providers who may enjoy economies of scale. Although much of the literature
suggests that mass transit operation is not characterized by economies, a private
contractor operates differently from a public entity. A private contractor can increase
capacity without limiting service to a localized area. Contracts can be negotiated in

/anw T. Bennett and Manuel H. Johnson, Beaer Qovemment gt Hal[the J'tice: Privale ProdJI,riQa a[ l'>tbli<

11

Services (Ottawa, JL: Caroline House Publishers, 1981), p. 37.
21Teal,

"Issues Rllised by Com~liti~ Conrracting of Bus Transit Service in tilt USA," pp.

396-3~.

'"Wendell Car and lean Lo~. d Public Pumose for fnblk Transit: A Response to rheEPl Rw>rt Policy Swdv
No. 211! (Santa MQrlica, CA: Reason Foundation, 1990), pp. 17-18.
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numerous areas across the country. When a private operator has numerous contracts
with public agencies for the provision of transit services, the fll<ed cost of providing a
service under an additional contract can be spread out over a larger amount of output,
resulting in a lower average cost.30

• Potential for Labor Specialization • The use of private sector entities that specialize in
specific services such as transit offers significant benefits with respect to the vast
experience that labor can have. A national private firm that contracts with many public
· agencies to provide transit services across the country has numerous specialized resources
upon which to draw. In particular, such a firm can draw upon expenise from experienced
labor across the country.

• Expanded Tax Base for Transit· The use of privatization can expand the constituency for
public tax dollar support for transit. Private entrepreneurs may join the coalition in favor
of more privatization if they believe they have future opportunities for contracting with
the public sector.

Cost-Relaled A;guments Against Contracting:

.

• Public Provision Less Costly • Many cost comparison studies indicate that mass transit

services can be provided at a cost comparable to or less than the private sector.
Typically, those comparisons that show cost savings through privatization do not include
fully allocated costs.l1 In addition, most studies note that there is no profit in publiclyoperated services.

• Neglected Costs of Private Provision • The emphasis on privatization to reduce costs on
individual routes within a transit system conflicts with the efficient operation of a
complete transit system. It is argued that a transit system is characterized by a network
of routes that work together to provide the most efficient service possible. As a result.
a system is not a collection of completely separable routes. Cost comparisons often
neglect the necessary costs of increased supervision and coordination associated with the
privatization of components of the system.32

'"Robett W. Poole, Jr., ' Objections to Privatization," Policy Review {Washington, DC: The Heritage Foundan"".
1983), i>· 3.
"Sclar, Schaeffer, and Brandweirl, p. 1.
"ll>ld.
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• Cost AllocaJion Deficiencies - Cost comparisons ate believed to have deficiencies which
result in biases in favor of ihe private competitive bidder: (1) the "fully allocated" public:
cost for a given route includes a ponion of adJninistrative overhead and is compared to
competitive bids that do not include administrative overhead; (2) the initial bids are
often below the true cost of providing services since bidders are known to be willing to
accept a loss initially in order to capture a share of the market; (3) cost comparisons
often ignore public equipment and services provided to private contractors by the public
agenc:y; (4) cost comparisons do not take into account the differences in the quality of
· service, including safety, reliability, etc; (5) private firms entering the market often
underbid due to a lack of knowledge about the industry.

• ExploitaJion of Tran.sit Employees -It is suggested that transit employees, both public and
private, may be exploited as a result of privatization effons.n lf the majority of cost
savings are attributed to wage and Cringe differentials, then private employees are being
exploited by private companies in order to reduce costs and secure a position in the
market. ln addition, whenever existing service is contracted out, jobs are taken from
public employees, thereby reducing their welfare as well. As a result, it can be argued
that employees of both public and private transit providers are adversely affected by the
contracting of operations, with the exception of those instances where individuals who
··
were previously unemployed are provided with new employment opportunities.

• Contract Waste- Opponents of transit.privatization obje·c t to the need to admiruster and
They believe that
monitor contracts when awarding contracts competitively.
administrative overhead has unnecessarily increased due to this requirement over and
above the existing overhead.
Competition • The issue of competition was discussed earlier in the textbook case for
privatization. As would be expected, proponents. of privatization reference the desirable
characteristics of perfect competition when arguing in favor of the contracting of services .

.

Competition AJxuments For CofllracJing:
• Optimal Allocation of Resources - The textbook definition indicates that perfect
competition is defined when each individual seller faces competition from other sellers
to the point where the market price is automatically deterrruned by the market as a

"Biadr, p. 18.
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whole, No individual seller has control over the price. As a result, the allocation of
resources is optimal, and all output is produced at minimum average cost. That is,
provision of output or services is efficient iii all respects. The process of competitive
bidding is intended to force competition in the provision of contracted services. This
should help result in conditions that approximate the textbook theory.

• Minimum Cost - Competition can help achieve an optimal allocation of resources in
the transit industry where the services are provided at a minimum cost. The use of
competitive contracting forces bidding firms to operate in the most efficient manner
possible in order to successfully win contracts with the public agency. In addition, the
public agency could also compete for the competitive contract and submit a bid along
with private operators.

• Incentive for Efficient Production - The incentive to produce goods and services as
efficiently as possible coincides with the textbook definition of competition.
Privatization is a mechanism for moving towards competition. Competitive firms are
constantly working to find meth_ods for lowering costs so as to maximize profits. This
incentive does not exist when public agencies are responsible for the operation of a
transit system.

Competition ~ents Against ConJracting:

• Monopoly Power in Lon8 Run -The belief that competition is inherently present in the
concept of transit privatization is not necessarily· true in the long run.34 The problem
is that suppliers of any service in a competitive environment continually search for
mechanisms that will give them an advantage in the market. If any such advantage
is achieved, then varying levels of monopolistic power begin to emerge. Even if
competition exists initially, there is no particular reason to believe that it will persist
in the long run. In the nineteenth century, all mass transit systems were privately
built, owned, and operated. "At first there was intense competition, but over time
stronger companies bought out weaker ones, and monopolies emerged in many
cities.,.J.S Reality suggests that a sufficient number of competitive suppliers will not
always be available, particularly when lengthy contracts are awarded.

"Sclar, Schaeffer, and Brandwe(n, p. 20.
"Black, p. I.
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• Potential for Corruption • Whenever humans are involved in the solicitation and
awarding of competitive bids, there will always be cases of corruption where public
officials are offered bribes or otherwise benefit from successfully awarding contracts
to specific bidders.36
.

• Reduced Cost is Wrong Priority • Despite the possibility of increased competition,
"privatization establishes the wrong priority for urban transportation systems."37 The
primary goal of using privatization is to reduce costs. Many believe that this should
not be the priority, but that the goal should be to optimize the speed, safety, and
convenience of citizens travelling in the service area of a transit system.

• Contract Shortcomings • Depending on the length and composition of awarded
contracts, the selected contractor may not be sufficiently rewarded for innovation and
cost reduction, thereby eliminating the incentive to increase the efficiency with which
goods and services are provided.

• Insufficient Number of Suppliers • In many geographic areas of the United States, an
insufficient number of suppliers of equipment and facilities may exist. If this is the
case, the transit system may still be able to take advantage of the limited availability
in the private
sector; however, the limited number of suppliers will also
.
. limit the
.
amount of.competition that exists in the· market
for
the
equipment
and
facilities.
.
.
OuaUty of Senice · Quality of service is often overlooked in studies of the benefits of
privatization, particularly the contracting of transit o·p erations. Evidence that is available
does not provide a clear picture concerning this issue. In many instances, the quality of
service has been maintained in the shift from public provision to private provision of
services. However, in other cases, problems have surfaced in the areas of service reliability
and on-time performance as a result of the private provision of services. Each side of the
issue is discussed in the arguments below. Additional controlled studies comparing the
reliability and on-time performance of public versus private provision of the same or similar
service are necessary in order to reach a conclusion concerning this issue.

"Poole, Qbi«tiOilJIO Priv(llization. p. 10.
11

Sclar, Schaeffer, and Bra11dwein, p. 1,
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Quality

of Sezvice Algwnents For Contracting:

• Quality of Service Maintained - Many studies indicate that transit users believe service
offered by private operators is of a higher quality than those operated directly by the
publi~ agency.

• More Responsive to Changes in Demands - Private companies tend to be more
. responsive to changes in consumer demands. If permitted by the contract, a private
system could adjust service so as to maximize the use of the system as consumer
preferences change in response to changes in the physical and economic environment.
'wbi.le the ability of many privatized services to be responsive is limited in terms of
service design, private sector services can be significantly different from public sector
service with respect to customer courtesy, driver attitudes, and other service
characteristics.
Quality of Sezvice Algumenls Against Contracting:

• Deteriorating Service Quality and Reliability - Opponents of privatization often argue
that the incentive to minimize costs and maximize profits results in a deterioration of
the .quality of service. It is believed that competitive firms will attempt to cut comeJ;'S
in order· t\) gain the competitive edge necessary to penetrate the mark~t: for a
particular good or service being contracted for by the transit system.
Transit Labor Implications· The implications of contracting as it relates to transit system
employees are significant. Regardless of how privatization is addressed and implemented,
labor is affected. When previously directly-operated services are contracted to the private
sector, the demand for existing system labor declines. When new services are contracted
to the private sector, the potential for hiring new system employees is eliminated. Most
view this situation as adversely affecting transit employees. The resulting dilemma is
diliicult to deal with, particularly since a significant portion of the cost savings is attributed
by most to lower wages and fringe benefits provided by private sector firms. The arguments
are strong for both sides of the issue.

Labor Implications • A1gumenls For Contracting:

• Union Employees Overcompensated - The strength of unions and/or the unwillingness
of management to negotiate aggressively has resulted in high compensation of
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employees in tenns of wages and fringe benefits in numerous industries in the United
States, e.g., the auto industry. The same trend has occurred in the transit industry.
Protective legislation and the strength of unions has resulted in wages and benefits
that are much greater than the fair market value that would otherwise occur in the
private sector.

Labor Implicaticns - Alguments Against Contracting:
· • Strong Union Opposition - Union opposition to transit privatization has been
particularly prevalent since UMTA's emphasis on private enterprise participation in
the 1980s. Labor unions often raise the issue that poorly-qualified and poorly-trained
non-union private drivers are taking the jobs away from union members, which enables
private contractors to undercut existing transit industry wage scales. If private
· contractors are able to provide services at a lower cost than the public agencies, transit
labor unions contend that the source of this cost savings is due entirely to wage
differentials.
Other Considerations - Several other relevant issues are addressed in the following

paragraphs with respect to the concept of privatization as ·it relates to the contracting of
operations.

PoliJical Aspects - The political aspects ·o f the public provision of mass transit are
significanL Typically, transit systems are governed by a Board of Directors, almost all of
whom are political players in the community. As a result, politics will always play a role in
the decisionmalcing of a transit system.
Many believe that the involvement of the private sector in the provision of services and
functions within a transit system will lessen the political nature of decisions made in a fully
public operation. For example, aggressive affirmative action programs or political patronage
may .not be as easily implemented if the transit agency does not directly control the
workforce. Others believe that political involvement is just as intense (perhaps more) when
privatization is introduced to the public decisionmaking process. In addition to lobbying
pressures exerted by private entities, it is politically easier to oppose spending believed to .
be inefficient than to oppose a program, such as mass transit, that is believed to ha,·e
significant public benefits.
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Many politicians and officials adhere to the privatization principle purely on philosophical
grounds that the government should not be doing anything that the private sector is capable
of doing on its own or through contracting with the public sector. Others feel strongly that
the provision of transit services is strictly a social responsibility that should be provided and
monitored by the public sector.
Service Organization • To the extent that it desires, a public transit system maintains
control over how services are organized. The public agency controls policy decisions and
operations. This may involve very little discretion or significant discretion given to
contractors who provide goods and services for the transit agency. However, the level of
discretion for the good or service to be provided must be clearly defined in the contractual
arrangement, including the determination of which specific goods/services are to be
provided, the establishment of performance standards, the administration of contracts, and
the monitoring of performance. By maintaining control, the agency will be able to achieve
a desired level of social equity. Numerous other factors must be considered closely in the
process of negotiating a contract, including the size of the service package, the length of the
contract, and who is responsible for providing vehicles for the service. Contract issues and
specifications will be analyzed more closely in subsequent technical memoranda.
Service Co111i:nuiJy- Transit agencies often express concern that, if services are privatized,
and especially ·if the private
sector is relied upon
.
. to provide v~hicles and mainienance
.
facilities, the transit agency risks being unable to accomplish its mandate should the
contractor fail or go bankrupt. Similarly, agencies may feel that the right to strike for
private sector employees may give advantages to labor in cases where public sector
employees are precluded from striking. In either case, contracting of transit operations
involves risks with respect to service continuity.

Safety - Although there is no concrete evidence to suggest a decline in safety as a result
of the contracting of operations, opponents of the concept argue that significant wage and
fringe differentials result from a decline in the quality of work performed by employees,
particularly that of the bus operators.

The Contracting of Maintenance
Various maintenance needs are also commonly contracted for, inciuding those necessary for
transit vehicles, other capital equipment, and buildings/facilities. A discussion of transit
maintenance duties is provided in a subsequent section of this memorandum.
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In the overall scope of contracting transit functions, most efforts focus on transit operations.
However, in some transit systems, contracting maintenance service is more prevalent and
is the primary area to be privatized. In some systems, the opportunity may exist to contract
out the entire vehicle maintenance function. In most cases, maintenance services are
contracted when it. is not economical to employ full-time labor, when the existing
maintenance facility does not have adequate capacity, or when specialized capabilities or
expertise are required (hazardous services or highly-skilled labor).
Arguments for and against contracting of maintenance services are presented below.

• Cost Savings • Cost savings is the major impetus for contracting maintenance. Public
agencies see the improvements that have occurred in the use of technology, skill,
training, and management practices of private firms as a measurable way to reduce the
costs of maintenance services. Contracting maintenance and support operations can
enable many public transit agencies to reduce capital and operating costs by over 30
percent and to improve service.38
A survey was conducted of the public transit systems in California to assess the extent
of contracting for maintenance services in the state.. This study reveals reasons for
privatizing operations, maintenance, and administration. The results are provided in
Table 4 and indicate that privatization efforts in maintenance are driven primarily by
cost considerations. A total of 42 percent of the systems in California cited cost as the
reason for contracting vehicle maintenance, while 67 percent cited the same reason
for contracting non-vehicle maintenance.

"ConiTrl<;t Sen>ic" Associalion, Final Report • Techl!o/pgy lmoa;JS EvqluotiQIJ. (Washington DC: Urban Mass
Transportation Administration, 1989), p. 1.

39

TABLE4
Reasons for Contracting by Semce Type,
California TraDSil Systems"

Revenue Service

18%

69%

8%

S%

43%

Vehicle Maiateo.ance

6%

4Z%

9%

12%

21%

NoaA•ehicle Maintenance

17%

67%

8%

8%

0%

Administrative Services

24%

33%

14%

19%

33%

• Flexibility· Another significant reason for the decision to contract vehicle maintenance
is the flexibility provided through contracting. Flexibility in this context refers to the
ability to obtain the necessary skills without a long-term commitment. This also serves
as a tool for determining future costs and is viewed as a cost saving measure. Twenty·
one percent of the systems in California cited this as a reason to contract maintenance
to a private firm.

..

• New Service • Providing maintenance for new service is also an argument for
contracting maintenance service. Maintenance service is not always available in the
area were the new service is initiated. Therefore, it is prudent to contract the
maintenance of vehicles to private firms rather than birild a public facility, especially
if the viability of the new service is questionable with respect to long-term operation.
• Qualified Contractors Exist· Qualified contractors do exist who can fulfill the necessary

requirements for transit maintenance. However, it will be necessary to improve the
awareness of the existence of such contractors to all segments of the transit industry.

• Contracting Procedures Affect Control • Procurement regulations have evolved to limit
competition to qualified firms with adequate capital, to address potential distortions
caused by low bid requirements, to provide incentives and penalties for performance,
19

Systan,Inc, V.e Use of (:cn@ctinr By Public Tromit Arencies in CaJifomia. (Los Altos, CA: California
Deptutmtnt of iransportGtion. 1986), p. 28.
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and to afford contracting agencies control over their vendors.40 This type of policy
allows maintenance contractors greater access to the transit market and more latitude
in the negotiations of a contract for the transit system. Recall that the study of
California systems considered this a significant reason to contract maintenance
services.

• Multi·Agency Depots for Repair, Rebuild, and Testing - Significant cost savings can be
achieved by developing regional centers that can serve as maintenance facilities for
an array of transportation modes such as trucks, buses, and rail. In addition to
consolidating redundant facilities and avoiding construction of more unnecessary
capacity, regional operations will lower costs through use of mass production
techniques, reduced parts inventories, and less management layering.41

• Leaseback Arrangements -These types of arrangements are commonplace in the transit
industry. In most arrangements, property owned by the transit system is leased to a
vendor to be operated as a maintenance facility and is then contracted with by the
transit system. In the transit industry, this is known as a type of turnkey arrangement.
More creative lease agreements will allow these types of contracts to play a significant
role in privatizing maintenance services.

.

• Automated Mainlenance Management Systems - Through the use of ,modem
information systems, work flow and the cosl: of performing maintenance tasks can be
accurately monitored for decisionmalcing by transit managers. This will allow cost
comparisons to be made between the private and public sectors and allow managers
to evaluate the cost-effectiveness of maintenance practices. A significant contracting
opportunity exists because in-house employees do not necessarily have the capability
to develop and maintain sophisticated computer software and bardware.42

..Conlrtl<t StiVices Assoclillion, p. 13.
41

Ibid.

"Ibid., p. 14.

41

Alguments Against ConJracting:

• Agency Standards • The cost-minimizing attitude of private firms requires inspection
programs to ensure that vehicles are maintained at acceptable standards.43 If
contract standards are not monitored effectively, the cost of contracting can nullify any
cost savings over the term of the contract.
• Stability of the Vendor • Some transit managers choose not to contract maintenance
service for fear that a vendor will either change ownership or go out of business.
Since it cannot be assumed that the new owner of a current maintenance agreement
will continue its service contingency, arrangements must be included in the cost of
contracting with a vendor. The same will occur if a firm goes out of business. In
either case, this can cause major disruptions in maintenance service and, subsequently,
in service operations.

·.

The Contracting of Administration
Various administrative functions of transit agencies are often contracted, including
administration lend
management, accounting, and marketing functions. Many areas
themselves to contracting. Often, the skill levels required to perform specific duties or tasks
are not available from the personnel within a transit system. This is frequently the case with
rural and small urban transit systems.

of

The reasons for contracting administrative services are somewhat different from 1he
considerations associated with contracting for operations and·maintenance services, where
cost is the most inlportant motivation. A review of Table 4, which highlights the results of
the contracting study involving transit systems in California, supports this statement.
Although cost savings remains an important consideration for the contracting nf
administrative services (33 percent), the flexibility (33 percent) that it can offer is indicated
as being just as important
Arguments for and against contracting administrative services are presented below.

'"Urllon Mass Transportation AdministrtUion, Barrim to friva(t SfC(or PanjcipatiQrJ in Public Tr!I!!Jpcna<~> "'\
p. 17.
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Arguments For Contracting:

• Temporary Labor • The survey of California systems indicated that most of these
services, such as marketing and accounting, can be provided without the use of fulltime labor. In situations where a public agency contracts with a private transit system,
the public agency may only have the option of contracting for administrative
personnel.

· • Special Skills • As mentioned earlier, special skills are often required to adequately
fulfill administrative functions. This is also a factor in contracting administrative
services, particularly when public sector compensation may not be able to attract or
afford highly-skilled, full-time employees or individuals who perform hazardous work
functions.
It is interesting to note that the cost of contracting for an administrative function may
exceed the cost to perform that service "in-house." In this situation, the significance
of contracting relates to added return in quality of work and expertise that a private
firm can potentially provide.
Arguments Against Contracting:

.

.

• Performance • Because most admil)istrative functions· are difficult to quantify, it may
take additional staff time and resources to evaluate the effectiveness of a vendor as
well as to monitor performance.

• Supervision • Guidelines for supervising contracted personnel can be complex, and
understanding their position within the organization can be difficult.

• Liability - Some administrative functions serve as a liaison between the contracting
agency and another public agency involving information that is sensitive to the
contracting agency. Resolving disputes that may develop on behalf of a contracted
vendor can be costly. An example of this would be a contract with a vendor to
complete a transit system's annual Section 15 Report. Since this report helps
determine funding levels for transit systems, a report that is not completed accurately
could have a significant impact on the amount of funding the reporting system
receives.
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OTHER PUBLIC/PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS IN MASS TRANSIT
Transit systems can use various types of public/private partnerships to achieve additional
revenues, cost savings, or the enhancement of facilities and services of the system.
Regardless of the type of public/private partnership implemented, successful partnership
arrangements should have the following characteristics: 44
(1)
· (2)
(3)
(4)
(5)

Active and persuasive personal leadership from both the public and private sectors.
Clear and specific objectives.
Flexibility for negotiating alternative plans.
Shared planning and implementation responsibilities.
A "win-win" result, where benefits are enjoyed by both sectors.

A number of specific public/private partnerships are defined and discussed below, including
joint development, cross border leasing, transportation demand management initiatives, and
turnkey operations.

Joint Development
In the transit industry, joint development refers to real estate development that is integrated
with an existing or proposed transit station/stop or other transit facility.45 A public agency
typically negotiates with a private entity to jointly develop a real estate project that will
benefit both parties involved in 'the investment. Both sectors share the risk involved in the
real estate investment as well as the benefits that can result from the development.
Examples of joint development may include an office building constructed in the air rights
of a rail station or the construction of retail mall with direct access to a transit
station/tenninal.46 Joint development projects can result in millions of dollars of
additional revenues annually. Successful projects have been implemented in Washington,
Miami, Atlanta, Denver, and numerous other cities.

MLouis E. Keefer As.sodales, PrQjjt lmRiications of Joillt Deyelop.ment: Three Institytional Al?Droache.t
(Arlington, VA: Urban Mass Transportlllion AdmiJtistration Office of Plan11ing Assistance, 1984), p. 34.
4

FrtUich and uitner, P.C, freliminazy E>·qluotion ofDARTJojnt 12fveloument Bevenye l'etentials (Dallas.
TX: Dallas Ami Rapid Transit, 1985), p. 1J.
"Public Technology, Inc, Joint Deyt/Qpment: A Handbook for l.pca/ Govemmenr Q(ficiqls (Washington, DC:
Urllan Mass Tronsponalion Administration Office of Planning Assistance, 1983), p. J.
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Benefits - Numerous benefits of joint development can be identified from the perspective
of the transit system, the public sector in general, and the private sector."

Transit Syste!" Benefits
• Increased ridership through the implementation of residential, commercial, and
institutional projects that attract transit users.
• Increased revenue from the sale or lease of the transit system's real estate to the
private sector entity.
.
• Enhanced environment around the transit station/stop or facility as a result of
amenities .added by the private sector.
• Reduced costs due to the sharing of land acquisition and construction costs of new
facilities.
• Improved intermodal connections within and between public and private
transportation systems.
Public Sector Benefits
•
•
•
•

Expanded job opportunities.
Opportunity to increase local property and sales tax base.
OpportUnity to implement regional planning policies.
Opportunity to recapture some of the value added to private property by a major
public improvement

Private Sector Benents
• Shared expenses and risks with a public agency and reduction in land acquisition
and site preparation costs . .
• Increased opportunity to capitalize on the market for various types of land uses
resulting from the linkage with new transit facilities.
• Opportunity for improved internal circulation and other amenities that can give
the project investment a competitive advantage.
• Prospect for expedited approvals and cooperation of various public sector agencies.

"Ibid.
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Risks - There is a cenain amount of risk associated with a real estate investment and,
although the risk is shared in a joint development project, the potential for failure still exists.
The primary risks associated with joint development include the unpredictability of the real
estate market and the significant potential for project delays.48

.
• Unpredictability of the Real Estate Market - The volatility of the real estate
investment results in significant risk being associated with joint development
projects, panicularly those projects that require an extended period of time to
negotiate, plan, and implement. As an example, a joint development project that
took five years to implement likely coincided with numerous up and down cycles
in the economy and the real estate market.
• Potential for Project Delays - More often than not, significant project delays occur
when the public sector is involved in a development project. Causes for delay
include legal issues, unanticipated planning and funding requirements, public
opposition, and others. Regardless, the likelihood of delays is usually greater with
the involvement of the public sector. Additional delays are difficult to tolerate for
the private sector since time is such an important factor in their financial stability.
Other disadvantages include the following:
.

.

• Not Conducive to Small Developer Participation - In order for joint development
to be worthwhile, the project must be relatively large. As a result, participation
of small developers is nearly impossible.
·
• May Compromise the Best Public Option - To facilitate a successful joint
development project, it may sometimes be necessary for the public agency to
compromise the best public option, i.e., the selected station location may not be
ideal with respect to service design but may be ideal to accommodate the joint
development project.
In summary, significant additional revenues can be achieved through the implementation of
joint development projects. Benefits can be enjoyed by the transit system, the public sector,
and the private sector. 1-{owever, risks are involved. These risks are reduced as a result of
the shared responsibility for the project by both the public and private sectors.
"Ibid, p. 29.
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Cross Border Leasing49
Cross border leasing is an innovative financing technique that involves the sale and
leaseback of public transit vehicles by a foreign investor seeking to use the tax shelter
benefits of owning and depreciating assets. The technique evolved from a similar technique
knoWn as "safe harbor leasing," under which public transit vehicles or other assets are
purchased by a private U.S. entity for the tax shelter benefits. These vehicles would then
be leased back to the transit system. The transit system would also receive a negotiated
ponion of the tax benefits realized under the agreement. Safe harbor leasing was abolished
by the 1986 Tax Reform Act, since these tax benefits reduced the U.S. Treas~'s general
fund and resulted in an indirect subsidy of public transit by the Treasury. The logic behind
cross border leasing is the same as safe harbor leasing, with the exception that cross border
involves a private entity from a foreign country.
A typical cross border leasing arrangement occurs as follows:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

A U.S. transit system negotiates a purchase agreement with a vehicle
manufacturer.
'J1!e transit system pays for the vehicles.
The vehicles are inunediately sold to the private foreign entity.
The transit sy~tem and foreign entity negotiate a leaseback agreement.

The financial benefits to a transit system that can result from a cross border lease vary,
depending upon the countries involved in the lease, the size of the transaction, the types of
vehicles purchases, and other factors. Transit systems can typically expect to receive
compensation ranging from four to eight percent of the vehicle sales price, less transaction
costs. For example, a purchase of transit vehicles totaling $100 million could result in a
financial benefit between $4 and $8 million prior to the inclusion of transaction costs. Due
to the transaction costs, "the feasibility of a cross border lease agreement is dependent upon
the size of the transaction. A transaction of $20 million is generally accepted as a minimum
for being financially feasible. Average transactions are approximately $50 million.

"Patrick Griffllh/Center for Uroan Transportation Research, ·cross Border Leasing- Implementation '"""
and ApplicatiOIU" Paper presented 01/he ASCE/ITE Co11[ercnce 011 lmplementing RegWnlll Mobility Solm""''·
Secaucus, Nl: May~ 1991.
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Although potential financial benefits are significant, there are also inherent risks involved
in the transaction, including:
• Negotiations could fail to produce an agreement between the parties involved. If
this were to occur, significant up-front costs would be incurred without an
agreement ever being reached, i.e., legal fees, travel expenses, etc.
• Other risks associated with cross border leasing can result from "unwind events."
Unwind events refer to situations in which the lease agreement could be
terminated. Examples where this could occur include loss of leased equipment as
a result of damage, bankruptcy of any of the parties involved, tax law or currency
changes, or other specific events specified in the lease agreement.
UMTA has adopted a policy of supporting these transactions. UMTA Circular C 7020.1,
issued in April 1990, states:
"...it is UMTA's policy to encourage and facilitate its grantees' use of
innovative financing and funding options. One of these options is for grantees
to enter into certain leasing arrangements with foreign entities referred to as
cross-border leases."
The adoption of this policy by UMTA has resulted in several successful cross border leasing
transactions, including those negotiated by the San Diego Metropolitan Development Board
and the New Jersey Transit Corporation. UMTA's poiicy will undoubtedly encourage more
use of this innovative financing· technique in the future. Although it has been used primarily
for the acquisition of rail vehicles, applications of this technique may extend to other types
of capital as well.
Public/Private Partnerships In Transportation Demand Management5°
Transportation Demand Management (TOM) is a transportation planning process designed
to alleviate congestion on highways. TOM initiatives can be classified into three major
categories:

'"Ctntu for Urot111 Trt11tSpottati011 R£searr:h, Commute Alternatives Svslems Handbook (Tampa, FL: Cent<r
for Urbtul Transporttlli011 Research, 1992), pp. 7·9.
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(1)
(2)

(3)

Actions that promote alternatives to the automobile.
Actions that encourage more efficient use of alternative transportation
systems.
Actions that discourage automobile use.

These actions are typically implemented by public/private partnerships that form Commuter
Assistance Programs (CAPs) and. Transportation Management Associations (TMAs).
Through the activities of CAPs, TMAs, and other public/private organizations, TDM
initiatives are being implemented across the state of Florida and the U.S. In an effort to
address congestion, growth management, energy, and air quality issues, these programs focus
on reducing the number of peak-hour single occupant vehicles through the use of TDM
initiatives such as carpooling, vanpooling, bicycling, walking, and the use of mass transit.
The logic behind these types of arrangements points to private sector involvement. The
probability for success in these TDM initiatives is enhanced when members of the private
community "buy in" to the concept of TDM. In addition, TDM approaches involve very
little capital, unlike most capital-intensive approaches to addressing transportation problems,
such as increased spending on highways and fiXed-guideway systems.
Turnkey Operations
A turnkey operation consists of a public agency issuing a performance specification for the
construction of an entire system, whether it be a rail system or a sewage treatment plant.
The logic is that private sector consortia will compete to provide final design and
construction and assist in the operation for a given period of time indicated in the contract
specification. By turning the entire project over to the private sector, the public agency no
longer needs to be concerned with cost overruns, on-time delivery, or the communication
necessaty to coordinate numerous equipment suppliers and contractors.51 At the end of
the specified time period, the private sector consortia then turns the "keys" over to the local
public sponsoring agency.
In a typical turnkey arrangement, the private sector consortium indicates in its proposal what
it is willing to contribute to the cost of constructing the system. In return, the selected
consortium receives benefits in the form of real estate development rights along the newlyconstructed system or in the air space above a station within the newly-constructed system.
"Jean Matie Aubrio4 ''Tough Talk On Turnkey," Raibw;£A~ September 1991.
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As a result, the private consortium benefits from ;eal estate development and the public

agency benefits from the reduced cost of implementing the system.

As federal assistance has declined in recent years for capital-intensive transit projeCts, local
agencies have begun looking to turnkey operations as a mechanism for implementing
systems that would otherwise not be in place. If the situation is right, a turnkey operation
can be a win-win situation for both. the public and private sectors. However, just as with
joint development, the success of the project weighs heavily on the real estate market.

so

V. INVENTORY OF TRANSIT PRIVATIZATION ACfMTIES
This section discusses the functions of a mass transit agency. A sample organizational chart
is presented, along with a review of the functional areas within a transit agency. The
functions fall into one of three areas: operations, maintenance, or administration. Each
area is defined below and the specific functions are presented. This is followed by a review
of the public/private alternatives to providing each of the functions.

TRANSIT SYSTEM ORGANIZATION AND STRUCTURE
A typical organization structure for a transit system is shown in Figure 12. In most
communities, the transit system is governed by a board of directors whose members are
either elected or appointed. The board of directors has seven major tasks:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Establishing objectives for the board of directors.
Establishing a strategy for the transit system.
Approving management objectives.
Resolving major issues.
Acting as an intermediary.
Obtaining revenues for the transit system.
Evaluating the 'management of t)le transit systemP

The chairman of the board of directors is responsible for seeing that the transit agency's
overall actions are in line with the goals and objectives of the municipality served.53 A$
a result, the board plays an important role in the decision to privatize functions within a
transit agency.
The functions of a transit agency fall into one of three areas: operations, maintenance, and
administration. Each of these are described in detail below, along with an inventory of
activities that can potentially be privatized.

' 1Institute jOF Urban Transportation aJ lndi4na Uuiversity, Handbook for Manarement Perfonnance cfudits

(B/OQmington, IN: Url>an Mass Transportation Administration University Research and Training Program, 1988),
p. 20.
"George E. Gray and Luter A. Hoe/, eds., fld>fjc Trglh!o0!1ation: fll/!!nine. OperatiQJY. and Manaument
(Engkwood Cliffs, Nl: Prmtice·Ha/1, 1979), p. 427.
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Operations
The operations function of a transit agency includes all daily activities necessary to provide
service to the community. This includes scheduling, dispatching, and the actual provision
of service. The size of tile system varies with the type of operation. Demand-respome
systems tend to operate on a smaller scale than fixed-route systems. Passengers access the
systems by walking to a designated location (fixed-route) or contacting a central control
center (demand-response).
Demand-Response Services • Demand-response services are generally offered by smallerscale systems in response to needs driven by transportation disadvantaged markets. The
vehicles may be taxis, vans, or small/medium-sized buses. Most passenger trips are ordered
by contacting a control center and informing it of trip origin, destination, and desired
departure time. Subscription service, where the passengers request the same service on a
regular basis, is also possible.

.

.

Demand-response service differs from fixed-route service in that passengers call a central
control center to arrange service. A dispatcher in the center who has a good knowledge of
the service area and its traffkconditions records this information and schedules the vehicles
to pick up and dr.op off as many passengers on a single trip as possible without.exceeding
a reasonable circuitry and time of travel for any one passenger.
..
Demand-response service can be the optimal mode in providing the following four types of
services:
• Special services for the disabled and elderly.
• Demonstration service in areas not served by transit.
• Late night or off-peak service, substituting for very lightly traveled bus routes in
low-density areas.
• Transit services in small cities, or transit service in suburban areas coordinated
with regular bus lines servicing the central city, or feeders to suburban rail transit
stations.S4

"Vuktvt R. Vuchic, U¢an fib!jc TrrmSI10!tation: Systems and Tes;hnQ/ofll' (EJtglewood Cliffs, Nl: Prentice-Hall,
1981), pp. 6()2.60$.
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Fixed-Route Services • Fixed-route services are provided along designated routes at
scheduled beadways. No prearrangement is necessary for service, and trips can be
purchased on a daily, weekly, or monthly basis. Variations in fixed-route services include
local bus service, rapid rail, advanced guideway, commuter express service, feeder routes,
vanpools, and park and ride routes. The types of fixed-route services typically considered
as good candidates for privatization include:
•
•
•
•
•

Fixed-route, local bus services.
Commuter express services.
Feeder services.
Vanpool services.
Park and ride services.

Maintenance
The maintenance function of a transit agency ensures the protection and prolongation
of the useful life of a system's capital assets in a cost-effective manner. The five major tasks
of a transit maintenance department are:
• Preparing a comprehensive maintenance plan.
• Developing 3.11d maintaining a prevenrive maintenance program.
• Providing for adequate diagnostic and repair facilities.
• Recruiting and developing personnel.
• Developing and maintaining an effective maintenance management information
system.55
Transit agencies perform two types of maintenance: vehicle and non-vehicle. Vehicle
ma.intenance may be performed on a set schedule or on an as-needed basis. Non-vehicle
maintenance is performed on a range of items, from physical structures to office equipment.
Each of these functions is described below, along with specific activities which can be
privatized.
Vehic:le Maintenance • Vehicle maintenance is an imponant activity for ensuring that the
fleet is mechanically capable of safely providing service. The decision to privatize vehicle
maintenance is a function of space requirements, cost considerations, and the uniformity of
" Ibid., p. 33.
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workload needs, all of which determine wHether full-time maintenance staffing is possible
and/or necessary.56 In addition, the availability of special skills and . state-of-the-art
equipment also plays an important role in this decision to privatize maintenance activities.
The following maintenance services are typically considered as candidates for privatization:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Engine and component rebuilding.·
Tue maintenance.
Rehabilitation services.
Air conditioning system maintenance.
Seat repair.
Painting.
Body workNon-revenue vehicle maintenance.
Towing.

Non-Vehicle Maintenance - Non-vehicle maintenance is performed on capital equipment
ranging from major facilities to office equipment. As non-vehicle equipment and facilities
have become more sophisticated, the privatization alternative has become more attractive,
since the system is not required to have specialized labor on staff. In addition, the nature
of many routine, non-vehicle activities may not require full-time employees to per(orm the
necessary services.. Examples include the maintenance of:
•
•
•
•
•
•

Office equipmenl
Radio and communications systems.
Building and grounds.
Janitorial service.
Data processing/management information systems equipment.s'
Bus shelters and signs.

"Public/Privale Worldng Group of the America11 Public Transit Asscx:ia/ion, Public TrQllSit S<Mw;
C®sideratjoas ja Conll!ICring (Was/Ungt011, DC; American Public Trornlt Association, 1987), p. 12.
"American Public TronsitAsscx:iaiion, Managing Mobjlj(y; A New Gener<Yioa Q.[Ngtjoqgl Policies for tht ! /J!
Centwy (WashingtOII, DC: American Public Transit Association, 1989), p. 13.
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Administration
The administration of a transit agency is responsible for supporting the overall management
of the transit agency. The major aspects of administration are planning, marketing, human
resources, and finance and accounting. Other activities include labor relations, legal
services, internal auditing, and public affairs. A discussion ·of the various functions follows.
Planning • The five main tasks of a transit agency planning department are:
•
•
•
•
•

Analyzing markets.
Conducting research.
Planning facilities.
Planning service.
Section 15 report preparation.

The function of the planning department is to ensure a cost-effective use of system assets.
It is responsible for ensuring that community needs are met through service design, including
route location, hours of service, frequency of service, fare structure, etc. Another
responsibility is to monitor changes in the physical operating environment and to anticipate
events that will necessitate a reevaluation of service. The preparation of schedules is also
a critical part of planninjl.ss It is possible for all of these activities to be privatized. .
Marketing - The marketing function traditionally involves five main tasks:
•
•
•
•
•

Conducting research.
Developing a marketing plan.
Producing/printing schedules and brochures.
Pricing service.
Promoting service.

"Institute for Urban Tlllllsportation at Indiana University, p. 24.
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The research conducted in this function focuses on current and potential transit riders. It
should also determine who does not use transit and why. The information gathered through
the research process is used by management and policymakers in developing an overall
strategy for the system.59 It is possible for all of these activities to be privatized.
Human· Resources • Human resources is a term commonly used to refer to the labor
relations and personnel functions of an organization. In a transit agency, this function is
responsible for:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Personnel planning and staffing.
Employee training.
Employee compensation.
Labor relations.
Employee recruiting, screening, and selecting.
Employee performance evaluation.60
Benefits management.
Grievances.

Finance and Accounting • The nine main tasks of this function involve:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Budgeting and financial planning.
Monitoring revenue and .expenditures.
Establishing and implementing protective controls.
Financial consulting.
Management audits.
Financial audits.
Accounting for the payroll.
Complying with grant requirements.61
Section 15 report preparation.

It is possible to privatize all these activities by contracting with an independent CPA or
accounting firm.

"Ibid., p. 30.
"'Ibid., pp. 4142
"Ibid., P· 38.

57

Other Activities - In addition to these main administrative functions, activities relating to
labor relations, legal services, internal auditing, and public affairs are also performed. While
not directly related to the actual provision of services, these activities are necessary to
ensure a smooth running agency. A partial list of activities in this area that may be
privatized include: .
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Data processing.
Telephone information services.
Legal services.
Legislative assistance.
Risk management.
Security services.
Construction management.62
Architectural/ engineering services.
Construction services.
Joint development planning.
Project financing.63

Each of these major functions is summarized in Tables S through 7. Also shown in the
tables are the type of private sector entity that would be appropriate for each activity .
recommended as a .Privatization candidate.

"'APT.A. p. 13.
"Ibid., p. 14.
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TABLE 5
Operation Activities

CATEGORY NAME
Demand-Responsive

.

Route

Fixed~

Commuter Rail

AcnVITY

PRIVATE SECTOR PROVIDER

Scheduling

Paratransit Companies/Bus Companies

Dispatching

Paratransit Companies/Bus Companies

Provision of Senice

P¥atransit Companies/Bus Companies

Regular Service

Management Companies

Feeder Service

Paratransit/School BusjMgmt Companies

Express Service

Paratransit/School BusfMgmt Companies

Park-n-Ride Service

Management Companies

Provision of Service

Management Companies

Source: Carter-Goble Associates, Privaie Sector Contractine Worhhop Manual for Rural and Small Utban
Public Transportation Providers, p. In-8.

TABLE6
Maintenance Atti't'ities

CATEGORY NAME
Vehicle

Non-Vehicle

.

AcnVITY

PRIVATE SECTOR PROVIDER

.

Vehicle Cleaning

Local Garages/Specialty Service Corp.

Body/Paint Work

Body/Paint Shops

Repai!s/Overhauls

EJll9ne(Transmission Shops

Routine Maintenance

Local Garages/Auto or Truck Dealerships

Office Equipment

Business Machine Repai! Shops

Radios

Authorized Service Repair Shops

Buildings

Janitorial Service, General Contractor

Grounds

General Contractor

Data Processing

Service Contractor

Source: Carter-Gable Associates, Pcivate Soctor Contracting Wocl;shogManuDI [0£ Rwat and Small Urban
Public Innspouatjon Providers, p. lll-8.
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TABL£7
AdmlolstraliOQ Activities

..
CATEGORY
Planning

.

ACOVITY

.

Section 15 Reports

Consultant

Transit Development Plan

Consultant

Management Audit$

Consultant/Management Company

Special Studies

Consultant/Management Company

Route Evaluation

Consultant/Management Co./Service Contractor

Market Analysis

Marketing

Human Resources

F"mance/Accounting

Other

PRIVATE SECfOR PROVIDER

. Research F"ltlllS

Planning Facilities

Consultant/Management Company

Planni.og Service

Consultant/Management Co./Service Contractor

Marketing Analysis

Research rums

Campaigns

Marketing/Public Relations Firms

Advertising

Marketing/Public Relations Farms

Labor Relations

Consultant/Management Company

Employee Training

Consultant/Management Company

Employee Benefits

Consultant/Management Company

Recruiting

Consultant/Management Company

Employee Evaluation

Co~tantjManagement

Section 15 Reports

CPA Fum

Budget

CPA rU1ll

Fmancial Planning

CPA Firm

Monthly Accounting

CPA Firm

Audits

CPA rum

Payroll

CPA Firm

Grant Administration

Service Contractor/Management Company

Reporting

CPA/Data Processing Company

Computer Processing

Consultant/Service Contractor/Management Co.

Procurement

Consultant/Service Contractor/Management Co.

Legal Services

Legal Firm

Public Affairs

Consultant/Management Company

Company

Souree: Carter· Goble Associates, Private Sector Contracting Workshop Manual for Rural and Small Urban
Public Tra!l.lportatjon Providers. p. 111-8.
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VI. THE CONTRACTING DECISION
Various approaches to contracting transit operations, maintenance, and administration are
reviewed in this section. Each approach identifies the specific roles of the public and
private sectors, ranging from fuU public sector responsibility to full private sector
responsibility. The range of options suggested for each contracting category is intended not
to be comprehensive but to provide an array of possible approaches. The primary focus of
this section concerns privatization of transit operations; however, brief discussions are also
provided concerning the contracting of maintenance and administration.

TRANSIT OPERATIONS
Three major criteria are typically used when making decisionS concerning transit operations:
effectiveness, efficiency, and equity. This section directly applies these criteria using the
"Criteria Implications Model for Transit Operations," a model developed by CUTR
specifically for this project. Once the model is explained, the implications of the contracting
decision on the model are explored to determine how privatization might help or hinder
transit systems in their efforts to meet these criteria.
EtTectiveness
.
Effectiveness refers to the relative degree of success in meeting the objectives of a transit
system. The objectives may be determined by the Board of Directors, the executive director,
system staff, citizens in the service area, or a combination thereof. As a result, effectiveness
may be defined differently by each individual transit agency. However, a range of objectives
can be considered in the analysis. At one extreme, a transit system's objective may be to
make transit service available to every person in the community. At the other extreme, the
objective may be to provide the best service possible to selected parts of the community
where demand is greatest. In each case, if both systems are satisfying their objectives, then
they are both characterized as being effective.

Efficiency
Efficiency refers to the allocation of resources to achieve the chosen level of output at a
minimum cost. In the context of mass transit, service is said to be efficient when a given
amount of service is provided at the least possible operating expense. A transit system
61

attempting to achieve efficiency should not be concerned with how much service to produce,
but rather with how and where to provide the service.
Equity

.

Equity refers to fairness in the distribution of welfare and serviceS. In the context of mass
transit, the service may be termed "equitable" if an equal amount and quality of service is
provided to all individuals within the service area. Although the equity criterion ultimately
involves value judgments, the definition indicated will be used in this analysis and is a
necessary consideration for public policy decisions.
Criteria Implications Model for Transit Operalions
Given the basic definitions provided for each of the criteria. a model can be devised which
shows that a transit system inherently chooses its level of efficiency and equity when its
objectives are specified and achieved (effectiveness). To illustrate, Figure 13 measures
efficiency and equity on the vertical axis and effectiveness (transit system objective) along
the horizontal axis. Measuring efficiency and equity on the same vertical axis may raise
questions; however, absolute measurement is not the intent of the model. The intent is to
provide relative magnitudes of the criteria in theory only.
. As stated in the defiriitlon for effectiveness, a transit system is deemed to be effective if it
achieves its specified objectives." Recall that the range of objectives has two extremes: ( 1)
providing service to the community to the maximum extent possible (full service}, and (2)
providing selected services which reflect the greatest demand (select service). This range
is shown as the two extremes for the effectiveness criterion in Figure 13. Each transit
system is assumed to meet its specified objectives, and therefore is assumed to be providing
effective service. As a result, the point of operation along the horizontal axis is given and,
as a transit system moves from "full service" to "select service" along the horizontal axis,
equity decreases and efficiency increases. This intuitively makes sense since, as the system
moves toward "select service," fewer individuals in the service area are provided the
opportunity to use the transit service (less equitable). At the same time, efficiency increases
since services with the least amount of patronage are eliminated. ·
As a result, the equity curve is depicted by a downward sloping line, while the efficiency
curve is depicted by an upward sloping line. The precise slopes of these lines are unknown;
however, the intent of the model is to show only whether the equity and efficiency lines are

62

upward or downward sloping. The exact slopes cannot be estimated and are not necessary
for the purposes of the model.
Since effectiveness is defmed by the transit system's objective, the point along the horizontal
axis is given. If a vertical line is drawn from this point, relative levels of efficiency and
equity can be determined. For example, if transit system A decides that its objective is to
produce service at point A, that service results in a relatively high level of equity (Q1) and
a relatively low level of efficiency (F1). Alternatively, transit system B may choose to be
much more selective in its service decisions (see point B). As a result, system B achieves
a higher level of efficiency (F:J, but a lower level of equity (Q2) , than transit system A
Based on their objectives, transit systems A and B are inherently indicating their preference
to achieve more equity or more efficiency. Equilibrium can be achieved at the intersection
of the equity and efficiency lines, at point E. This is the point at which equity and e(ficiency
are jointly maximized.
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Approaches to the Provision of Transit Operations
Several public/private alternatives for the provision of transit services are reviewed, all of
which involve varying levels of participation by both the public and private sectors. The
purpose of this section is to review an array of public/private approaches to the provision
of transit operations ·and to determine the implications of these approaches on the Criteria
Implications Model. Table 8 presents seven public/private approaches to the provision of
transit services and identifies the public and private sector roles in each of the approaches.
This table is an adaptation of work previously conducted by Pagano.64
TABLE 8

Public/Private Approaches to tbe Provision of Transit Operations

APPROACH

PUBLIC SECTOR ROLE

PRIVATE SECTOR ROLE

1

S)'Siem-wide planning, coordination, and

No rote.

operation.

2

System-wide planning and coordination;

Operation of demand-response and

Operation of r1Xed·route service.

feeder bus service throutW. a competitive

bidding pr~.

3

System-wide. planning and coordination;
Operation of a majority of fuced-route
service.

4

System-wide planning and coordination
with input from contractors; Operation of
a majority of flXed-route services.

Operation of demand-response, feeder
bus, and some ftXcd-route sorviee through
a competitive bidding proeess.
Operation of demand-response, feeder
bus, and some ftXed-route service through
a compelitive bidding process; Can
provide input concerning planning and
coordination of contracced services.

5

System·wide planning and coordination.

OperatiOn$ of ruced route, demand·
response, and feeder bus through a
competitive biddiog process.

6

Competition with the prlvate sector;
s.ys.tem·wide planning. coordination, and

Competition with the public sector;
planning, coordination, and direct

operation of serviees.

operation of competitive services.

Regulation and some level of funding
support.

All services through competitive bidding
proeess; planning. coordination, and
operation negotialed by private rums and
public agency.

7

"'Anlhorry M. Pagano. •ptfvtUe SectorAlternatives for Public Trall.!portation. • Tranwmt!l!ion Oumwty, pp. 4).1·
449.
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Each approach considers which sector is to be responsible for the basic roles of planning.
coordination, and operations. As indicated previously, the list of approaches is intended not
to be comprehensive, but to provide an array of possible approaches. A transit system could
choose one of these approaches, a combination of these approaches, or an entirely different
approach.
Description or Approaches • A brief description of the public/private approaches to transit
operations is provided in this section.
Approach # 1 · This approach describes r.he type of transit system that currently exists
in many urban areas of the country. The coordination, plannin_g, and operation of transit
services are provided solely by the public transit system. The private sector has no role
under this approach.
Approach #2 • The second approach is similar to the first, with the exception that
all demand-response and feeder bus services are contracted to the private sector through
a competitive bidding process. The transit system continues to provide coordination and
plalllling for all services, but only operates fixed-route services.
Approach #3 • This approach goes one step further by not only contracting for
demand-response and feeder bus services, but also contracting for selected fixed-route
services deemed appropriate for the competitive bidding process. System wide planning and
coordination continue to be handled by the transit system.
Approach # 4 ·The fourth approach is exactly the same as approach #3, except that
now the private contractors are given the opportunity to provide input into the planning and
coordination of the contracted services.
Approach #S • Under this arrangement, the transit system continues to provide
planning and coordination for the entire system; however, :~li services, including fixed-route.
demand-response, and feeder bus, are provided by the private sector through the
competitive bidding process.
Approach #6 ·This approach permits both the public and private sectors to compete
in the provision of transit services. Both the public and private sectors are responsible for
planning, coordinating, and operating their respective services.
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Approach #7 - In the final approach, aH planning, coordination, and operations are
negotiated by private firms and the public agency. The public sector continues to be
involved in the competitive bidding process and with regulation that may be appropriate for
safety considerations.
Application or Contracting to Criteria Implications Model
It is clear that, as a transit system moves from Approach # 1 to #7, the role and discretion
given to the private sector is increasing, while the role of the public sector is decreasing.
Each approach can now be applied to the Criteria Implications Model to determine how it
affects the criteria relationships discussed previously.
T\\:'0 primary assumptions are made in the application of the model:
(1)

As the role and level of discretion increases for the private sector, the
efficiency line shifts parallel in an upward direction. As a result, each
transit system objective is now associated with a higher level of
efficiency. This is a plausible assumption, since a significant majority
of the literature concludes that the services provided by the private
sector (under contract) tend to be much more efficient than services
provided by the public sector.

(2)

The transit system is assumed to be operating as efficiently as possible,
given the current level of service as determined by the system's
objective. That is, performance measures such as labor productivity
are assumed to be maximized. Although this may be an unrealistic
assumption, it does not change the implications of contracting on the
model. Removing this assumption would only complicate the model
and would conclude with the same result. Therefore, the assumption
is made to ensure that the model is more easily understood.

As Figure 14 indicates, Approach #1 results in the existing efficiency curve for the public
sector, since the private sector has no role. However, in each of the subsequent approaches,
the efficiency curve shifts upward each time the role of the private sector increases. As a
result, a transit system objective can result in higher levels of efficiency, while maintaining
the same level of equity. It is also important to note that the upward shifts in the efficiency
curve coincide with increases in the efficiency-equity equilibrium (E" E 2, etc.). If the
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ultimate objective is to jointly maxtmtze both efficiency and equity, mcreases in the
efficiency-equity equilibrium are desirable.
FIGURE 14
Criteria ImpUcatioos Model for Transit Operations,

A Consideration or the Seven Approaches
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An example can be applied to the model to help understand the implications of contracting.
The example is illustrated in ·Figure 15. Suppose a transit system's initial objective is
defined as providing "full service" at point A. At that point, efficiency is at its lowest at F 1
while equity is maximized at Q 1• The transit system realizes that significant cost savings
could be achieved if it were to contract·several of the feeder service routes that serve its rail
system. Since cost savings are realized, the system has increased the efficiency with which
feeder service is being provided, thereby shifting the efficiency line parallel in an upward
direction. The result is an increase in efficiency to F2, while equity has been maintained at
Q 1• Next, the transit system decides to eliminate several routes that are attracting very little
ridership and to redirect the resources to enhance routes that have shown promise in
attracting significant ridership. This indicates a change in the transit system's objective from
A to B. Efficiency improved up to F3 at the expense of equity, which declined to Q 2• The
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decline in equity occurred due to the transit system moving away from its initial "full service"
objective. As the figure indicates, policy decisions can continuously result in increases in
efficiency and declines in equity to the point of equilibrium at point E, where the transit
system objective is at point C and both equity and efficiency are jointly maximized at FQ.
All veaical increases in efficiency can be attributed to increased use of the private sector,
while the sloped increases in efficiency result from a chang~ in the transit system's objective
to increase efficiency at the eJUlense of equity.
FIGURE IS
Criteria Implications Model for Transit Operations
Transit System EXllmple
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Criteria Implications Summary
The implications of this theoretical model for transit system operations should be clear. If
a system is able to achieve its objective, there are specific levels of equity and efficiency that
coincide with that level of service. Through a consideration of the relationships. among
these criteria, a system may want to adjust its system objective to achieve a greater level of
equity, efficiency, or a better balance between the two criteria. The contracting of transit
operations provides one mechanism for the transit system to adjust the criteria relationships
to one that suitably matches the philosophy of the. transit system.
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TRANSIT MAINTENANCE
Several public/private options for the provision of vehicle and non-vehicle maintenance are
reviewed in this section. Table 9 presents four approaches to the provision of maintenance
services and identifies the public and private sector roles in each of the approaches. Just
as indicated in the discussion of transit operations, these four approaches are not intended
to be a comprehensive list of all possible approaches to the provision of transit maintenance.
The intent is to suggest several possible approaches.
TABLE 9
PubUc/Prlvate Approaches lo Transit Maintenance
APPROACH
1

PUBLIC SECTOR ROLE

PRIVATE SECTOR ROLE

System-wide vehicle and non-vehicle

No roJe.

maintenance.

.

2

Non·vchiclc, preventive, and other
limited m~intenancc. needs as determined
by the capacity of the public maintenance
facilities.

Major maintenance efforts that are not
feasible for the public maintenance
facilities.

3

Preventive n;tainteoance only.

All otheJ maintenance needs.

4

No role.

Sysrem~wide

maintenance for entire

system.

Approach #1- In the first approach, the public sector is responsible for system-wide vehicle
and non-vehicle maintenance. In this arrangement, the private sector has no role. In the
short run, the transit system is limited by the capacity and technology of it.s existing
maintenance facilities.
Approach #7. • The second approach places the responsibility for non-vehicle, preventive,
and other routine maintenance needs on the public sector. Minor maintenance needs are
defined as those maintenance functions that can be adequately provided by the existing
public sector facility. All major maintenance needs which go beyond the capacity of the
existing maintenance facility are contracted to the private sector.
Approach #3 ·Under this arrangement, the public sector is only responsible for preventive
maintenance of the vehicles. All other maintenance responsibilities are contracted to the
private sector. This may include leasing out facilities and equipment to be used by the
private sector.
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Approach #4 • The final approach contracts all maintenance needs to the private sector.
The public sector has no role other than to monitor the contracts established through the
competitive bidding process.
Based on the previous discussion concerning the contracting of maintenance, there are
clearly many maintenance functions that can be provided by the private sector which could
potentially result in cost savings. Several factors must be considered in the deci.sion to
contract for transit maintenance including the capacity and technology of existing
maintenance facilities and the nature of the maintenance workload over time. Existing
maintenance equipment and facilities should be fully utilized as long as the technology is
not outdated to the point of being detrimental to· productivity. If equipment and facility
technology reaches this point, then maintenance contracting should be considered. In
addition, if maintenance needs have exceeded the capacity of the existing maintenance
facility, then contracting should be considered. Finally, if the transit maintenance workload
tends to fluctuate over time, contracting may be an ideal solution for handling the workload
during the peak times.

TRANSIT ADMINISTRATION
Severa) public/private options for the provision· of administrative responsibilities· are. also
reviewed. Table 10 presents five approaches to the provision of administrative services and
identifies the public and private sector roles in each of the approaches. Again, just as with
transit operations and maintenance, the list of administrative approaches is not intended to
be a comprehensive list of options. A transit system could utilize one of the listed
approaches, a combination of these approaches, or an entirely different approach to the
provision of administrative services.
Approach #1 ·The first approach places the burden of all administrative responsibilities on
the public sector. The private sector has no role. All planning, marketing, and human
resource issues, along with other miscellaneous administrative responsibilities are provide
by employees working directly for the transit system.
Approach #2.·In the second approach, the public sector is responsible for all administrative
functions with the exception of those related to finance/accounting. This may include hiring
an accounting firm for budgeting, financial planning, monthly accounting, auditing, payroll.
and the preparation of various reports required of transit systems, i.e., Section 15 Report.
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TABLEIO
Public/Private Approaches to Transit Administration

APPROACH

PUBLIC SECTOR ROLE

PRIVATE SECTOR ROLE

l

System-wide administration.

No role.

2

ResP.,nsible for planning, marketing,
human resour~ and other
.
misce.Uaneous administrative
responsibilities.

Responsible for fl.nance/accounting
functions.

3

Responsible for plao.niDg, human
resowccs, and other mlsceUaneous

Responsible for finance;ac:c:ouncing and

marketing fuuctions.

administrative responsibilities.
4

Responsible for planning and other

Responsible for fUiancejaccounting.

miscella.a.eous administrative

marketing, and human resources.

responsibilities.

5

Contract administration and some
m.isceUaneous administratlvc
responsibilities.

System-wide administration with tbe
cxccplioo of some miscellaneous
administrative responsibilities.

Approach #3 - The third approach is the same as Approach #2, except that the marketing
functions are also contracted to the ptivate sector. A public relations firm could be hired
to develop advenising ideas and marketing campaign, while various research firms could
. be hired to conduct market analyses.

a

Approach #4 - An extension of Approach #3, this approach includes the contracting of the
finance/accounting and marketing functions as well as the human resources functions. A
contract with a management company may result in the labor provided on-site by the
contractor. The labor provided would already have expertise in issues such as labor
relations, employee training, employee benefits, recruiting, and others.
Approach #5 • In the final approach, all administrative functions could be carried out as a
result of contracting with a management firm, with the exception of the level of effort
required to monitor the contract.
There are many benefits to contracting with a management firm for administrative labor.
The primary benefit is the immediate availability of staff knowledgeable in the transit
industry. Little research has been conducted to determine the implications of contracting
for administrative labor. It is uncertain whether cost savings are realized. Additional
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research is needed in this area in order to better compare tbe performance of contract labor
versus directly-hired labor.

LEVEL OF DISCRETION GIVEN TO PRIVATE SECTOR
The level of discretion and authority that a public agency gives to a private sector entity as
part of a contractual arrangement bas critical implications with respect to the resulting
benefits. Clearly, the more discretion given to a private contractor, the greater is the ability
of that private entity to use its entrepreneurial skills to achieve cost savings and increased
productivity. However, as the level of discretion to the private sector increases, the risk
associated with the contractual arrangement also increases for the public agency initiating
the contract.
As an example, a contract that arranges for a private sector entity to provide drivers for a

specific transit service gives the private entity very little discretion over decisiorunaking
related to the provision of this service. In this scenario, the private entity provides labor
only. If cost savings are achieved, it is solely the result of wage and fringe differentials and
not the result of competitive entrepreneurial skills. However, even if labor is the only
re~ponsibility of the. private entity, entrepreneurial skills may be used in encouraging and
motivating the drivers to increase productivity.
There are numerous areas within the contracting decision where discretion can be given to
the private entity, including provision of labor at various skill levels, procurement of capital
equipment, route design, planning and scheduling service, and numerous others. These and
other factors will be discussed at length in subsequent memoranda \vith respect to the level
of discretion given to private contractors.

TilE CONTRACTING DECISION - A SUMMARY
This section reviewed the various public/private alternatives to the production and provision
of transit operations, maintenance, and administration. A Criteria Implications Model for
Transit Operations was proposed and developed as tool for understanding the implications
of the contracting of transit operations. Contracting of maintenance and administration was
also discussed along with a spectrum of the levels of discretion that a transit system could
choose to give to the private sector in the contracting of services.
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This section was intended only to introduce some initial thoughts with respect to contracting
in the transit industry. Subsequent technical memoranda will analyze and discuss the
implications of contracting much further. Particular emphasis will be placed on the level
of discretion given to private sector entities.
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VII. SUMMARY
"Privatization in Mass Transit" is the first of three technical memoranda being prepared as
part of a comprehensive transit privatization study sponsored by the Florida Department of
Transportation. The purpose of this study is to discuss the status and potential of mass
transit privatization in Florida. This technical memorandum is comprised of five major
sections, each of which is summarized below.

Privatization Defined
Privatization--turning over a public property, service, or function tO the private sector--in the
mass transit indusuy has been a subject of great discussion in recent years. Contracting of
transit operations, maintenance, and administration has been implemented by transit systems
across the U.S~ primarily in response to the privatization policies developed by UMTA.
Government involvement in mass transit has increased rapidly in this century. Total
government expenditure increased from just over $10 billion in 1929 to nearly $1.6 trillion
in 1987, an increase of 152 percent Most agree that some level of government involvement
is necessary; however, differences in opinion arise concerning the degree of involvement that
government should have in the provision of goods and services. The traditional purpose of
government is ·to intervene when the private market fails to achieve an optimal or :near~
optimal allocation of resources. This leads to a discussion of the classification of goods and
services. The classification process helps determine which goods and services should
logjcally be provided by the public sector. Four claSsification categories were presented
based on two criteria: the degree of exclusion and the jointness of consumption. These
categories include private goods, common-pool goods, toll goods, and public goods.
Mass transit fits the criterion for a public good in that it can be consumed jointly, but it also
fits the criterion for a private good in that it can be excluded from certain potential
·consumers. As a result, mass transit falls within the toll good classification. The status of
mass transit in today's society is that it is being treated more as a public good than as a toll
good. Various forms of privatization can be used to move mass transit from the public good
realm back towards the toll good realm. The decision that must be made is where along
this line should mass transit be provided to serve the public's best interest.
Two major categories of transit privatization were identified, including the contracting of
services and public/private partnerships. Contracting of services includes those services
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related to the operation, maintenance, and administration associated with a transit system.
Public/private partnerships include arrangements such as joint development, cross-border
leasing, transportation demand management initiatives, and turnkey operations.
Government Role in Transit Privatization
A review of the evolution of mass transit through 1985 provides some insights into how and
why the industry went from one comprised primarily of private operations to one comprised
primarily of public sector .operations. The federal initiative in transit privatization in the
early 1980s is reviewed along with UMTA's initial philosophy concerning this issue. This
is followed by a discussion of the evolution of UMTA's privatization policies since 1985.
The section concludes with a brief discussion of public/private arrangements that have been
implemented in Florida, along with some recent privatization legislation passed by the
Florida Legislature.
The Transit Privatization Debate
The debate over the use of privatization in mass transit has been heated, particularly since
1985 when UMTA began encouraging the concept "to .the maximum extent feasible."
Convincing arguments can be made in favor of and against the concept. The textbook case
in favor of privatization lies in the theoretical framework of perfect competition, which
provides convincing argtiments for the concept in theory. Specific arguments are discussed
in this section which support and refute the contracting of operations, maintenance, and
administration. A summary of the arguments concerning the contracting of operations is
provided in Table 11. Other relevant considerations are discussed, including poli tical
aspects, service organization, service continuity, and safety. Arguments are made for the
contracting of maintenance and administration as well, and a discussion of these is provided.
A number of specific public/private partnerships in mass transit are discussed, including
joint development, cross border leasing, transportation der.1and management initiatives, and
turnkey operations. Each of these public/ private arrangements is discussed along with the
advantages and disadvantages associated with their implementation.
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TABLE 11
Summary of Issues in the Contrncting of Transit Operations

or

of Cootractlng
Co5t
Redueed Bureauency
Redueed Tune Costs

Public Provision Les.s Cos11y

Neglected Costs of Private Provision
Cost Allocation Deficiencies
Exploitation of Transit Employees
Contract Waste

Slower Cost Growth
Potential for Eeonoo»es of Scale
Potential Cot Labor Spedalizadoo

~~~~ Tax Base for T,•.,;,•n:;;:•.:;;;t_.,._,._,----L.-,----=----------- -l

·.

•<

Optimal Allocation of Resources

Monopoly Power in Long Run
Potential for Corruption
Reduced Cost is Wrong Priority
Contract Shortcomings
Insufficient Number of

Minimum Cost

I.Doeolive for Efficient Production

of SerYice
Quality of Service Maintained
in Demands

Deterioration in Service Quality
Deterioration in

:rransit Labor Implications
Union Opp0$ition

Union

..
Inventory

ot Transit Privatization Activities

Following the presentation of a typical transit system organization and structure, this section
outlines the specific responsibilities of the three major functional areas of a transit system:
operations, maintenance, and administration. After the specific responsibilities were
identified, tables are provided that indicate potential private sector entities that could be
contracted with to handle these responsibilities.

The Contracting Decision
The contracting decision reviews some specific approaches to the contracting of transit
operations, maintenance, and administration. Numerous approaches are identified for each
functional area, each of which involves varying levels of responsibility for the public and
private sectors. The approaches presented are not intended to be a comprehensive list, but
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are intended to provide a sense of the possibie public/private arrangements that could be
implemented.
The level of discretion and·authority that a public agency gives to a private sector entity as
part of a contractual arrangement bas critical implications with respect to the resulting
benefits. Clearly, the more discretion given to a private contractor, the greater is the ability
of the contractor to use its entrepreneurial skills to achieve cost savings and increased
productivity. However, as the level of discretion to the private sector increases, the risk
associated with the contractual arrangement also increases for the public agency.
There are numerous areas within the contracting decision where discretion can be given to
the private entity, including provision of labor at various skill levels, procurement of capital
equipment, route design, planning and scheduling service, and numerous others. These and
other factors will be discussed at length in subsequent memoranda with respect to the level
of discretion given to private contractors.
This section introduces initial thoughts with respect to contracting in the transit industry.
Subsequent technical memoranda will analyze and discuss the implications of contracting
much further. Particular emphasis will be placed on the level of discretion given to private
sector entities once specific case studies have been analyzed more closely.
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